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Adding Fuel to the Fire? The Role of Petroleum in Violent Conflicts
1 Preface
Heinz Krummenacher
When you buy coffee, bananas, or mangos you are able to choose products with known
origins and conditions of production. You can make sure that you buy ecologically sound or
fair-trade products with labels that guarantee sustainable production and fair prices for 
farmers. This also applies to carpets, clothes, and flowers. Organizations such as the Max 
Havelaar foundation provide consumers with freedom of choice and ensure, for example,
that carpets were not made by a child's hands.
However, the same standards do not apply to petroleum products. At the petrol station, it 
is futile to look for pumps with a label similar to Max Havelaar's. We don't seem to care 
whether or not petrol has been refined from oil that was produced according to acceptable
ecological and social norms. Oil, the lifeblood of the industrialized world, only becomes an
issue for the consumer when petrol and fuel oil prices rise, or when we feel that
environmental pollution compromises our quality of life. 
It comes as no surprise that the topic "Petroleum and Violent Conflicts" plays only a
marginal role in political and scientific discourse. Before the last Gulf War started, there
were discussions whether the reasons for going to war were Saddam Hussein's alleged 
weapons of mass destruction or the control over oil reserves in Iraq and the whole region.
However, such strategically inspired discussions obstruct one's view of a different
phenomenon: the fact that oil is a curse rather than a blessing to developing countries.
Fossil wealth has not diminished poverty and hardship in any conceivable way. On the 
contrary, oil generates corruption among political elites leading excessive lifestyles and 
whose primary concern is to augment their power and wealth.
What is the relationship between oil and violent conflict? Why have so many countries
been plagued by violent conflicts after the "black gold" was discovered? On the other
hand, why is this not the case in a country like Kazakhstan despite its huge oil and gas 
reserves? And how can the vicious cycle be broken so that governments and rebels who 
permanently destabilize entire countries and regions do not use revenues from oil and other
natural resources to buy weapons?
These are some of the questions that we want to address in this conference paper.
Throughout its 15-year history, swisspeace has turned its attention to the ecological causes 
of violent conflicts. Therefore, the 2003 annual conference entitled "Adding Fuel to the 
Fire? The Role of Petroleum in Violent Conflicts" continued a long tradition. As a Swiss
organization, we don't only want to look at what some of the major countries should be
doing. We also want to focus on what we can do here in Switzerland, a small country that
could still exert some significant influence. 
Finally, we not only want to deal with the here and now, but we want to look into the
future and ask ourselves what a conflict-sensitive resources policy could look like. Sheikh
Jamani, the Saudi oil minister during the 1970s, recently predicted: "The Stone Age came 
to an end not because we had lack of stones, and the oil age will come to an end not 
because we have lack of oil."
7
Maybe this end is already near – but we just don't know it yet. Perhaps because we don't
know, it is even more imperative to begin designing concepts and strategies for a resources
policy in harmony with peace.
I hope that you will enjoy reading this conference paper. It features articles from conference 
speakers and panelists as well as transcripts of two panels. On behalf of swisspeace, I 
thank those who have contributed to this interesting and worthwhile publication.
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2 Lifting the Oil Curse 
Paul Collier 
Oil discoveries provide resources to some low-income countries on a scale that dwarfs aid. 
Yet their effects have often been adverse. Oil has been associated with economic 
stagnation and the destruction of other export activities.1 At the political level, it is 
associated with violent conflict.2 Why has oil been so damaging and what can be done 
about it? 
Why has oil been damaging? 
Historically, representative government arose because governments needed to raise large 
revenues for warfare. Conceding representation and scrutiny to taxpayers was the price of 
popular compliance in taxation. By reducing the need for taxation oil reduces pressure for 
scrutiny: people are less concerned about the misuse of public money if they have not been 
taxed in order to generate it. How much this weakening of pressure for accountability 
matters depends upon the pre-oil situation. If the country was already a functioning 
democracy, as in Norway, accountability can easily be maintained. 
In addition to the lack of accountability, large revenues induce a contest for the control or 
influence. Resources devoted to the struggle to capture control are a pure waste from the 
social perspective – termed 'rent-seeking'. Yet if rent-seeking is unchecked, people will 
devote resources to it equal to the value of the rents available. If this happens the society 
will be no better off, but in the process the character of the society will have radically 
changed. Rent-seeking might draw the brightest people into politics instead of business, 
because the returns to political power are so high. It might also draw people into 
criminality. For example, highly organized gangs tap into pipelines and ship plundered oil 
out of the country. Criminal and political actions sometimes shade into each other. In the 
Delta region of Nigeria, a movement that was initially protesting against injustice and 
environmental degradation rapidly evolved into gang warfare between villages for the 
control of the right to run protection and kidnapping rackets. 
The purest form of politically expressed rent-seeking is secession. Civil wars in oil exporting 
countries are almost always secessionist, whereas elsewhere many civil wars are 
ideological. The people living in the vicinity of the oil have an obvious economic interest in 
claiming the resources for themselves. Nation states are usually recent agglomerations of 
previously distinct political entities, and this process of assimilation has often been 
contested. Hence, oil is often discovered in regions where some political groups – albeit 
often on the fringe – are already claiming autonomy. The presence of natural resources 
enables such groups to add a credible economic argument to what is otherwise likely to be 
merely a romantic appeal. An example of this transformation is the (non-violent) rise of 
Scottish nationalism which can be precisely dated to between the 1970 and 1974 general 
elections. At the 1970 election, as in all previous elections, the Scottish National Party won 
only a tiny share of the vote and gained only a single seat in parliament. In 1974 its vote 
rose to 30%. The transforming event that brought about this change was surely OPEC's 
dramatic increase in the world oil price in 1973. The oil off the shores of Scotland was 
suddenly seen as valuable: the party campaigned on the slogan 'it's Scotland's oil'. 
Oil may be distinctive in its romantic connotations of affluence. For example, the GAM, the 
rebel movement that has been attempting to achieve secession of Aceh from Indonesia, has 
used the analogy of Brunei in its propaganda, claiming that the population of Aceh could 
be equally rich. This is a massive, and presumably deliberate exaggeration, but may well 
10
appeal to the popular imagination. A million people came out into the streets to support 
the GAM. Of course, the economic attraction of secession is compounded by the 
detachment of government: grievance reinforces greed. 
While government detachment and the lure of secession provide motives for rebellion, oil 
may also make rebellion materially more feasible. Rebellion is usually expensive. Oil 
companies are threatened with sabotage of pipelines, and their employees are kidnapped 
and ransomed. A related phenomenon is 'war booty futures'. Here the rebel group finances 
its activities by selling extraction rights contingent upon subsequent victory. This is 
reputedly how President Sassou-Nguesso returned to power in the Republic of Congo. 
In addition to these political effects, oil can have directly damaging economic effects. The 
classic economic analysis is 'Dutch disease': oil displaces other exports. In economic terms 
this is an efficient response, at least in the short run. Because the society is richer, it needs 
to produce more of the goods and services that cannot be imported,  and these are 
produced with resources released by the now-redundant export sector. Although in narrow 
economic terms this restructuring might be efficient, it might have political-economy effects 
that are dysfunctional. As the non-oil export sector withers away, pressure to stay 
internationally competitive diminishes, and this may slow the pace of productivity growth. 
Remaining industry may look only to the domestic market and seek its profits through 
lobbying the government for protection rather than through maintaining competitiveness. 
A further economic effect is the likely imbalance between public and private investment. 
Even if the government invests the oil revenue, it directly controls only public investment 
such as infrastructure. Private investment may become less attractive as a side-effect of the 
contest for control of the oil rents. For example, in Nigeria a huge increase in public capital 
formation coincided with a collapse in private investment. Currently Nigeria has around 
three times as much public capital as private capital, whereas the average for both the 
OECD and East Asian economies is five times as much private capital as public capital. In 
such circumstances public investment is likely to be relatively unproductive. 
A final economic effect of oil is exposure to price shocks. Even post-OPEC oil prices have 
swung massively - between $10 and $30 a barrel. During the booms governments take on 
commitments that cannot be sustained during the slumps. A particularly common approach 
– Congo, Cameroon - has been to protect and subsidize high-cost manufacturing industry 
in good times, being forced to abandon it in the slumps. The capital invested in these 
unsustainable activities is a pure waste. 
What can we do? 
These political and economic effects of oil have cumulatively been sufficiently serious to 
waste a huge opportunity to finance development. What can the international community 
do about it? 
The most direct action is to promote revenue transparency. Until oil revenues are 
transparent it is not possible to scrutinize how they are spent. Transparency is therefore 
necessary to address the problem of 'detachment'. In addition, transparency can reduce the 
problem of secessionist pressure. Recall from the example of the GAM in Aceh that rebel 
movements deliberately exaggerate the value of oil revenues. Secrecy makes such 
exaggeration easier. 
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The NGO Global Witness has led efforts to encourage transparency. One approach is to 
demand compulsory reporting of payments by individual oil companies. However, this has 
disadvantages. It is politically difficult to achieve international action on the basis of 
compulsion: some companies see it as a breach of confidentiality, and the governments 
that receive oil resource revenues see it as yet another developed country insinuation that 
they are corrupt. Further, if companies were to report using different accounting years, or 
different concepts of revenue, it would be impossible to arrive at a credible aggregate 
figure: too much disaggregated information would, paradoxically, provide too little 
information for effective scrutiny. An alternative approach, which has been suggested by 
the UK government, is for companies to be required by the government of the oil-rich 
country to report on a confidential basis to an international agency, which would then 
publish aggregate information. This has several advantages. First, the host government 
would have the choice as to whether to make reporting a requirement. Hence, it would not 
itself be the subject of compulsion but would rather be a critical participant in producing 
transparency. Once a 'template' for revenue reporting is established, governments adopting 
it would be signaling their commitment to honest governance. This ability to signal would 
itself be most useful to governments that face a problem of poor reputation – it provides a 
mechanism whereby they can live down the past. The template would require all 
companies, including national companies, to report. By contrast, if the reporting 
requirement were to come from OECD countries it would apply only to some companies 
and so would disadvantage them – in turn making OECD countries reluctant to impose 
such discriminatory requirements. Finally, by introducing an informed international 
intermediary, the reported data can be required to conform to some standard concepts.
Transparency of revenues is only a step towards the scrutiny of expenditures. Without 
transparency of revenues scrutiny of expenditures loses much of its point, but transparency 
is not in itself scrutiny. The purpose of scrutiny is to establish how oil revenues are spent 
and this in turn requires scrutiny of the entire budget. In most oil-rich developing countries 
the institutions that would normally undertake such scrutiny – parliamentary committees, 
allied with an auditor-general office and an investigative press – are currently insufficiently 
effective. The international community can promote scrutiny both by building the capacity 
of these institutions and by pressuring governments into accepting their enhanced role. The 
reward for change in government behavior is greatest for those governments burdened by 
a poor reputation – whether with their own electorates or with foreign investors. In some 
contexts institutions of scrutiny need to be established from scratch. For example, in Chad 
as a result of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline new government institutions were established,  - 
helped by pressure from oil companies - along with an ad hoc group drawn from civil 
society. Experience to date suggests that even this ad hoc approach has been quite 
effective. The precise architecture of scrutiny would need to differ, country-by-country, 
depending upon what is already in place. 
Between them, transparency and scrutiny would curtail rent-seeking. They would also 
reduce the incentive for secession. Secessionist groups would no longer be able to 
exaggerate the scale of revenues, nor would they be able to contrast the prospect of local 
accrual of revenues with embezzlement at the national level. The best defense against 
secession is likely to be credible evidence that revenues are being used for nationally 
equitable expenditures such as primary education. Transparency and scrutiny provide at 
least some counter to the problem of 'detachment'. Gradually, the population may come to 
recognize that oil is indeed owned by the nation. 
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Exposure to price shocks can be reduced through insurance, savings, and export 
diversification. As an example of insurance, the World Bank is a major creditor to both oil 
exporting countries and oil importing countries. Currently, debt service to the Bank by oil 
exporters is around $6 billion per year, and debt service by oil importers is around $12 
billion per year. Hence, there is at least in principle the potential for these two payments 
streams to move in a precisely offsetting fashion, conditioned on the oil price. When oil 
prices were high, oil exporters would take over some of the debt service obligations of oil 
importers and vice versa. The World Bank would gain by reducing its default risk, and both 
oil exporters and oil importers would gain from less volatile net incomes. 
Transparency, scrutiny and stability would improve the climate for private investment. This 
in turn would facilitate export diversification. Indonesia shows that it is possible: over the 
same period that oil destroyed Nigeria's other exports, Indonesia broke into a range of non-
traditional export markets. Dutch disease need not imply an absolute decline in non-oil 
exports.
Conclusion
Oil revenues have been a missed opportunity for many developing countries, yielding 
stagnation and corruption. At the heart of this failure has been a lack of transparency in the 
receipt of revenues, a lack of scrutiny in how they have been spent, and a lack of stability in 
the economy. The international community is now seriously concerned to transform such 
countries. Hesitantly, and with setbacks, it is moving beyond using aid as the only 
instrument, towards 'policy coherence' – the attempt to make other policies, such as trade 
and military intervention, more supportive of development. The disastrous cocktail of 
secrecy and instability in oil-rich societies is not inevitable. A few specific actions could 
make a large difference. 
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Notes
1 See Gelb (1988) and Sachs and Warner (2001). 
2 See Collier et al. (2003) and Collier and Bannon (2003). 
References
Bannon, Ian and Paul Collier eds. (2003) Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Actions 
and Options, World Bank. 
Collier, Paul and associates (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development 
Policy, Oxford University Press. 
Gelb, Alan and associates (1988) Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse?, Oxford University Press. 
Sachs, Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner (2001) The Curse of Natural Resources, European
Economic Review, 45, 827-38. 
14
 Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Role of Petroleum in Violent Conflicts 
   15 
3 Oil Fuels War in Sudan 
Egbert Wesselink 
"There is no security problem." Awad Ahmad al-Jaz, Minister of Energy about oil 
exploitation, in Al-Sharq al-Awat, October 7, 2003, London. 
Dirty business 
In 1997, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) completed an oil 
pipeline in Sudan from Western Upper Nile in southern Sudan to the Red Sea. Most of the 
work force were Chinese convicts who earned a reduction in their sentences. Finances 
came from international money markets. Confidence and technical know-how came from 
Talisman Energy of Canada, 25% owner of the GNPOC. Security was to come from the 
government of Sudan (goS) armed forces and the poorly engineered 1997 Khartoum Peace 
Agreement, which temporarily brought over a number of local military leaders to the side of 
the government. 
Before 1997, Western Upper Nile was a quiet side-show in Sudan's civil war. Its rural areas 
had been outside of the control of the government since 1983 and had been administered 
successively by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M) and the former 
South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A), now merged with the SPLA/M. After 
1997, Western Upper Nile became a major focus of military activity. Control over the oil 
fields became a key military objective for the government; oil development and civil war 
converged. The human rights situation worsened dramatically. Thousands of civilians were 
killed and many tens of thousands were forcibly displaced. 
The war in Western Upper Nile is part of the wider civil war between north and south that 
has raged for decades, but oil changed its pattern. The conflict zone was extended. The 
armed opposition attempted to maintain control over its traditional Nuer and Dinka 
territories by attacking military and economic targets, while government forces established 
control over vast stretches of land by attacking their armed opponents and chasing away 
the civilian population. Oil income transformed a low-budget bush war, fought by rag-tag 
armies into modern counter-insurgency warfare between asymmetric parties. The 
companies built an all-weather oil road which allowed the government to set up garrisons 
deep into Nuer territories and support them through the wet season. Oil income allowed 
the government to modernise its army and to purchase new weapons: helicopter gunships, 
battle tanks, precision guidance systems for high altitude bomber planes, armed personnel 
carriers etc., resulting in an escalation of the level of violence. In 2001, oil revenues 
represented 38.5 percent of the state income, up from zero in 1998. According the IMF, 
Sudan's military expenditures were US$242 million in 1999, almost 40% of the state 
budget, and rose to US$362 million in 2001, a rise of 50%, roughly proportional to the 
total rise in government earnings as a result of the oil boom. They have stabilised since. 
Government oil revenues are expected to reach US$600-700 million in 2003. 
Much of the dirty work was done by government controlled militias, allowing the GoS and 
oil companies to call it inter-ethnic strife. Very large areas were cleared of their original 
Nuer population, in 1997-1999 along the pipeline to the Heglig operation site, then along 
the new all-weather road north of Bentiu. The systematic burning of houses, destruction of 
livelihood and the frequent planting of mines indicated a strategy of deliberate 
depopulation. Meanwhile, ethnic composition of large areas is being changed by the 
settlement of Arab speaking Northerners in traditional Nuer territories. 
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Late 1999, the main theater of forced depopulation operations shifted south from Blocks 1 
and 2, operated by Talisman Energy, to Block 5A, coinciding with the construction of the 
150 km all-weather road from Bentiu to Adok, near the Thar Jath oil field. Lundin 
Petroleum from Sweden and OMV from Austria together held a majority stake in this 
concession area, with Lundin as the operating company. The international observers from 
the Civil Protection Monitoring Team found that in January 2003 in Block 5A "Many 
thousands of civilians have been forcibly displaced from their villages by direct military 
attack in the areas Lara-Tam-Nhialdou-Leel and the villages south of Mankien and Mayom. 
Conditions are equally bad along the new Bentiu-Adok main road where most villages are 
now empty or destroyed." 
The impact of oil exploitation on the population of Western Upper Nile has been 
devastating. It is arguably the world's most destructive and socially irresponsible economic 
activity. While some of the oil companies have been forced to realise that they cannot 
simply ignore the human catastrophe surrounding them, on October 7, 2003, Minister of 
Energy Awad Ahmad al-Jaz was quoted in Al-Sharq al-Awat (London) saying "The areas in 
which drilling first started in the south were one day rugged territory and there were no 
inhabitants there. We created development there and people settled in these areas. There 
was no talk about north and south or east and west." 
International concerns 
In 1999, an alarmed Canadian government sent a fact-finding mission to Sudan. Its finding, 
published as the "Harker Mission's report", was that "oil is exacerbating the war in 
Sudan". Canada took no action against Talisman Energy. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy 
stated that there was no legal basis for that without international sanctions against Sudan. 
Instead, his government made a moral appeal to Talisman to adopt a non-binding 
regulation, which it did. Talisman soon adopted an exemplary code of conduct, financed 
local charity, and produced a social responsibility report that was partly verified by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. The company improved its public reputation, but the facts on the 
ground did not change. 
Three consecutive UN Special Rapporteurs for Human Rights in Sudan also concluded that 
oil exacerbated war in Sudan. In June this year, the UK Special Envoy to Sudan, Mr. Alan 
Goulty, stated that "Government income from oil has fueled the war". The last UN Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. Gerhart Baum, identified the following human rights concerns: 
 forced displacement of indigenous populations and associated abuses to provide 
security for oil operations; 
 the security arrangements and the use of oil industry infrastructure by government 
forces and militias leading to abuses; 
 oil revenues intensify warfare. 
A separate concern that he mentioned was the absence of proper monitoring of the human 
rights situation in the oil areas. 
There was no international response to these alarms. 
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Governance gap 
Since 1997, European governments and the EU have treated oil's nefarious impact on 
Sudan as a non-issue. Instead, the IMF-instigated GoS financial reform was welcomed. The 
declining inflation rate and the fact that the GoS, oil income permitting, started to fulfil its 
international financial obligations was seen as an encouraging step towards Sudan's 
international respectability. While the EU and its member states were seriously engaged in 
promoting peace and respect for human rights in Sudan, and while they were spending 
hundreds of millions of Euros each year to alleviate the war-related suffering of the 
Sudanese people, not once did a European government or institution express concern about 
the allegation that European industries "exacerbated war in Sudan". On the contrary, the 
role of European companies was downplayed. In 2003, several European Ambassadors 
expressed their regret that Asian companies had taken over from the Canadian and 
European ones, as the latter were believed to care about human rights. Needless to say 
that the superior human rights performance of the Western vis-à-vis the Asian companies is 
lost to the population of Western Upper Nile. 
The USA has a less ambiguous stand on Sudan, having banned all US commercial relations 
with the country. The ban will be lifted after the signing of a comprehensive peace 
agreement only. In 2001, a majority in the House of Representatives adopted an 
amendment to the Sudan Peace Act that would additionally delist non-US oil companies 
working in Sudan from the New York Stock Exchange. This would have been a serious 
blow, especially to the Chinese National Petroleum Company. The Congress, though, 
rejected the amendment, supported by the White House, which followed Mr. Greenspan's 
objections against non-economic criteria in financial market regulations. 
The international neglect of oil's role in Sudan's war before 2002 remains puzzling. The 
companies completely failed to regulate themselves. When in early 2003, the European 
Coalition on Oil in Sudan launched its Benchmarks for Oil Exploitation in Sudan, not one 
company reacted, except OMV, whose CEO stated that if the company had to respect such 
rules, it would have to close down. 
Current situation 
In 2002-2003, Western companies' interests in Sudan were reduced. Talisman and OMV 
sold their assets to ONGC Videsh (India), while Lundin Petroleum sold its majority share in 
block 5A to Petronas Carigali. Still, Lundin holds its 24.5% interest in Block 5B. Total holds 
the 120'000 km2 Block 5 stretching almost to the Kenyan border. The company is expected 
to start working as soon as the peace agreement is signed. The Netherlands has a low-
profile interest in oil exploitation in Sudan. Talisman used to work through an Amsterdam-
based subsidiary company, and until 2002 paid at least EUR 100 million in direct taxes to 
the Dutch Government, making the country a major beneficiary of Sudan's oil wealth. 
ONGC Videsh, the Indian buyer of Talisman's assets, also works through an Amsterdam-
based special purpose company, ONGC Nile Ganga B.V., managed by Rejus. Current 
aggregate Dutch tax income from oil exploitation in war-torn Southern Sudan probably 
exceeds EUR 200 million. 
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Talisman, Lundin and OMV made hundreds of millions of dollars profits from the sales of 
their interests, almost doubling their investments or better. Still, provided that the peace 
process will enable further development of the fields, their Asian buyers are believed to 
have a very good deal. Overriding motives for the Western companies to sell their assets 
were security and reputation risks. Domestic public pressure forced the companies to 
express concern about the way the GoS managed security, but the Sudanese government 
refused to take these concerns into account. The January 2002 GoS offensives in Block 5A 
forced the companies to suspend operations for a second time in two years. Meanwhile, 
during the summer of 2002, when the wet season slowed down the fighting, the GoS 
demanded resumption of the work, threatening to annul the concession contract, under 
which the companies were obliged to develop block 5A. In October 2002, OMV and Lundin 
went to Malaysia and China to propose a combined oil industry plea with the GoS to 
change the security management. They received a blunt no. 
The basis of trust between Lundin/OMV and both its business partners and the government 
was seriously eroded now. Also, senior management of OMV had begun to doubt whether 
any peace agreement would ensure lasting peace in Western Upper Nile. Late 2002 and 
early 2003, the GoS went on the offensive again, despite the 2002 ceasefire agreement 
between GoS and the SPLM/A. A devastating report by an international monitoring team, 
detailing attacks on villages along the oil road, smashed the companies' claim that they 
were a force for good. By the summer of 2003, both Lundin and OMV had sold their 
interests in Block 5A. 
Sudan's up-stream oil industry is currently dominated by Asian and Arab companies, 
notably the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC, state owned), Petronas Carigali 
(state dominated, Malaysia), ONGC Videsh (state owned, India), Gulf Petroleum Company 
(Qatar). CNPC and Petronas are allegedly deeply involved in the security management of 
their concession areas. They stand accused of arranging weapons deliveries, providing 
military advice and services, in the Chinese case including armed units. Nevertheless, the 
GoS is reportedly unhappy with its dependence on these companies. It slows down the rise 
of Sudan's international economic status and the Asian companies are less competent. 
They are less reliable, less swift and less efficient than Western oil companies. 
It is expected that Western oil majors are interested to step in as soon as a peace 
agreement is reached. It is noteworthy in this respect that the CEO of Chevron paid a visit 
to Khartoum last August. 
Oil as an obstacle and an opportunity for peace 
Even before September 11, the USA concluded that peace was the surest way to eliminate 
Sudan as a potential basis for terrorism. Peace would allow for the full exploitation of 
Sudan's oil resources, and was presented as an incentive for peace. A durable peace 
settlement will allow Sudan to maintain and expand its total oil revenue at US$1 billion for 
at least a decade. If well managed and equitably distributed, this could help consolidate 
peace. The EU copied this line of thinking. Before, EU member states did not consider oil's 
potential leverage for peace and kept silent about its negative impact. Neither Lundin nor 
OMV have ever been contacted by their respective home governments, let alone be called 
to account for their operations in Sudan. 
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There is no reason to believe that oil exploitation has been a vital precondition for the 
current peace process. The peace dividend would have been much bigger if there had not 
yet been any oil production. The desire to secure oil revenues has undermined mutual trust 
and has played into the hands of hard liners on all sides of the civil war. Oil will pose a 
danger to the dynamics of the peace process as long as the GoS and the oil companies are 
prepared to pursue oil development by whatever means necessary. The aggression in the 
oil areas have fuelled the armed opposition groups' suspicion that the Northern elite only 
support the peace process because it offers them an opportunity to grab the oil. It also 
widened fissures between the SPLM/A and government-aligned Nuer militias. The GoS 
divida-et-impera tactics is a potent threat to security and stability in the south, whether 
peace is concluded or not. Without international supervision and enforcement, the greed 
for the oil income and the risk of local clashes will continuously jeopardise peace. 
Governance gap 
Why do countries like Switzerland and the EU member states make a formidable political 
and financial effort to end a war, and ignore the business operation that is at the heart of 
that war? Why allow the private sector full freedom to undermine foreign policy objectives? 
Why engage with the Sudanese government to respect human rights and keep silent about 
the bags of money made from those very same violations? 
Decisions made by private sector parties can have considerable impact on peace and 
stability, development, security, human rights, good governance and other key foreign 
policy objectives. However, the private sector is not held responsible for its impact or called 
to account for its responsibilities. Despite the huge damage that the private sector can do 
to foreign policy objectives, and despite the universal legal obligation to promote respect 
for human rights, not one country in the world is considering mechanisms that would 
ensure corporate compliance with international norms and standards. The core objective of 
the international community, peace, is not considered to be an binding concern for 
business. The leading industrialised countries have no legal framework that impose 
international legal obligations on their subjects. Governments advocate voluntary 
regulation, knowing that it will not do the job. By doing so, they falsely assume that peace 
and international law are essentially moral issues and matters of personal choice. 
The regulation of businesses during armed conflicts is an imperative for conflict 
management. An international regulatory framework should prevent the continuation of 
'business as usual' when such business plays a negative role on the course and impact of 
violent conflict. 
What can be done? 
International law already obliges private enterprises to respect all basic international 
principles, but there is no forum for which non-state actors can be called to account for this 
obligation. When the ius cogens is at stake, and it always is in matters of war and peace, 
the issue is Corporate Social Accountability rather than Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Developments in international law point to an emerging legal obligation on the part of 
states to ensure that their nationals do not commit, participate or profit from the 
commission of human rights violations. We need an international regulatory framework to 
deal with the worst cases of business involvement in human rights abuses, where they 
support or profit from violent conflict. 
20
Very often situations are not black or white, but we see clashes of rights and interests. In 
ordinary legal practice, a court balances these rights and interests. In cases where the 
international community has taken ad hoc measures against certain business operations, 
the balancing has been a political process. This is not ideal because political actors are 
interested parties. In absence of an independent international forum that balances rights 
and interests, I propose to institute a mixed forum of business, governmental, experts and 
civil society representatives to advise our political leadership on how to judge the impact of 
business operations in zones of violent conflict. The business community itself will have a 
key role to play, the system should be transparent and practical, and focused on removing 
the worst offenders from the international markets. Applied to the EU, it could look like the 
following: (with many thanks to the excellent study Deconstructing Engagement, by 
Georgette Gagnon, Audrey Macklin and Penelope Simons. Ottawa, January 2003). 
1. The EU must adopt mandatory regulations, applicable to business in conflict zones and 
based on existing international legal principles. It should make enterprises responsible 
for ensuring that their conduct does not contribute to human rights abuses, and that 
they do not profit from such abuses. It should oblige companies to undertake 
independent risk assessments that include the human rights and humanitarian 
consequences of their activities. These risk assessments must be shared with the 
European Commission. The Commission will dispose of a range of incentives and 
penalties to promote respect for the rules. 
2. The EU establishes a Working Group comprised of representatives from industry, 
international organisations, NGOs and independent experts. The Working Group will 
review companies' risk assessments and will investigate complaints received. It will 
have the capacity to monitor certain situations. The Working Group aims to achieve 
observance of the rules by engaging with individual companies, proposing revisions of 
business operations if necessary. In the worst cases, it can recommend to the EU to 
impose modifications of company operations or to outlaw a business activity. 
3. The Working Group reports to the European Commission; its reports will be made 
public. The Commission reports its response to the European Parliament, which can 
demand the Commission to revise its decision. 
4. The mandatory regulations are supported through the EU international trade policy. 
5. As we cannot wait for all this to happen, EU immediately develops short manuals of 
do's and do not's for companies in relevant countries. The embassies of member states 
promote this manual actively in their contacts with their national companies, and 
report home in case of non-cooperation. These reports are shared with the national 
parliaments.
6. The EU Member States adopt legislation that allows non-national civil parties to 
demand compensation before a national court in a company's home state, for damage 
sustained as a result of a business operation outside of its national jurisdiction. 
If Canada, Switzerland and the EU had had such a system in 1996, it would have prevented 
Sudan's oil misery. A good set of rules and mechanisms for Total to observe before the 
company kicks off in Block 5 in Southern Sudan is urgently required. A system like this 
would be extremely helpful to limit the risks of future internal strife in the many resource-
rich regions of Sudan. 
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4 Oil and Conflict: 
Lundin Petroleum's Experience in Sudan 
Christine Batruch 
Introduction
Lundin Petroleum1 obtained the rights to explore for and produce oil and gas in concession 
Block 5A, Unity State, Sudan, in February 1997; it sold these rights in June 2003.
During the period in which the company was active in Sudan, it operated in the belief that 
oil could benefit the economic development of the area and the country as a whole, and 
that this would have a catalysing effect on the peace process. The problems which it 
encountered in the area, however, led the company to constantly reassess its activities, role 
and responsibilities there. 
This chapter examines the reasons why Lundin decided to operate in Sudan, the challenges 
it faced in the course of its activities, the steps it adopted to satisfy both its commercial 
objectives and ethical concerns, and its efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict.
Sudan's war 
Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war that began shortly after it gained independence 
from the United Kingdom in 1956. It is one of the longest and most tragic wars of modern 
history: fighting has taken place for nearly 50 years, with a single reprieve between 1972 
and 1983.2 The Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A), led by rebel leader John Garang, are the main protagonists in the conflict which 
resumed in 1983, although armed militias in different parts of the country have also been 
involved at various times. The fighting has taken place chiefly in the southern-most parts of 
the country although other areas, such as the Nuba Mountains region, Unity State and 
more recently the Darfur region of western Sudan, have also witnessed periods of intense 
combat.
It is difficult to ascertain the root causes of the war and the contributing factors over such a 
long period of time. Nonetheless, certain elements have, at various times, played a role in 
the conflict. They include: (a) he country's extreme poverty—Sudan is ranked among the 
poorest nations of the world;3 (b) the religious/racial divide—northern Sudan is mainly 
Arab and Muslim, while southern Sudan is African and Animist or Christian; (c) the com-
petition for power—political opponents seek a greater participation in power, while 
regions seek greater autonomy from the central government; and (d) the competition for 
resources—southern regions contest the government's control over national resources such 
as water and oil, which originate in the south. 
When peace is achieved, it will be easier to determine which of these elements played the 
decisive role in the conflict and its eventual resolution. What is clear, however, is that the 
war began years before the presence of oil was even suspected, and it was only after oil 
was produced that a material basis for a sustainable peace was seen to have been 
achieved. It is only then that an active, internationally mediated peace process began.4
Until that time, Sudan's war had been largely ignored, except from a humanitarian 
perspective. The conflict was seen as another typical African war: over local issues and 
involving local parties. The situation seemed insoluble because of the many problems to be 
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resolved and the slight foundations for sustainable peace. However, in the course of the 
1990s a number of developments brought the world's attention to Sudan. 
The early 1990s had seen the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which figured prominently in 
the Sudanese Government; the harbouring of renowned terrorists such as 'Carlos the 
Jackal' and later Osama bin Laden; and the suspicion that Sudan was linked to the 1995 
assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. At this stage, Sudan was 
considered a 'rogue nation' which had to be isolated from the community of nations.5 In 
the latter part of the 1990s, however, the government adopted certain progressive 
measures, which the international community interpreted as signals of impending reform 
and of Sudan's interest in shedding its pariah status. The steps taken by Sudan included the 
handover of Carlos to French authorities, the expulsion of Osama bin Laden, the purging of 
key Islamic fundamentalists from the government, allowing the return of political 
opponents from abroad, the signing of the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement with southern 
opposition groups (see section III), improved relations with neighbouring countries, and the 
adoption of a new Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
Whereas the United States was reluctant to recognize these efforts immediately, the 
European Union (EU) decided to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Sudanese 
Government because it believed that this approach was more likely to bring results than 
keeping Sudan isolated. Thus, when Lundin acquired the rights to explore for and produce 
oil and gas in Block 5A, world opinion regarding Sudan was beginning to change. 
Lundin in Sudan 
The company's primary concern when considering a new area for activities is geological. If 
an area presents the required geological profile—that is, if it is assumed to contain oil 
reserves—Lundin proceeds to study the technical and commercial feasibility of exploiting 
the oil. In the case of Sudan, the main risk identified in the course of the company's risk 
analysis was financial. The company decided, however, that the estimated potential oil 
reserves were important enough to justify the significant investments required for the 
venture, in particular investments in infrastructure development. It did not identify any 
legal risks—there were no international or EU sanctions against Sudan that prohibited a 
European company from doing business there—or political risks—there were no SPLA 
forces in the concession area, as the civil war was proceeding further south. 
The company therefore engaged in negotiations to obtain a licence to explore for and 
produce oil and gas in Block 5A. As in most countries, mining rights in Sudan belong to the 
central state. Negotiations were therefore held with representatives of the Sudanese 
Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM). The terms of the agreement were standard for the 
trade, with an initial period for oil exploration—in exchange for a work commitment and 
the carrying of costs—followed by a period of oil production, with cost recovery sought 
after initial production. The only terms that were specific to the exploration and production-
sharing agreement (EPSA) concerned the 'Sudanization' of the operations. At the request of 
the MEM, the company committed itself to hire and train Sudanese with a view to their 
constituting 50 per cent of the staff within 5 years of the commencement of operations and 
80 per cent within 10 years. There was also a provision that the company would carry the 
costs of its Sudanese partner, Sudapet, which had a 5 per cent interest in the venture. 
On its first visit to the concession area, Lundin met with key representatives of the local 
community, who welcomed oil activities as the only way to promote long-term economic 
development in their area.6 They also committed themselves to providing a safe  
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environment for the company to operate in. This commitment arose out of the terms of the 
Khartoum Peace Agreement, which they had signed with the Sudanese Government and 
which set out the parties' respective rights and responsibilities in the area.7
Security, however, proved to be elusive. The prevalence of arms, coupled with the division 
of tribes into various factions, contributed to making the situation volatile.8 Within a few 
years, instances of fighting started to increase. While the company was not directly affected 
by the fighting at the time, it was nevertheless worried about the safety of its staff and its 
operations. It was also concerned because of the criticisms that were being directed against
an oil consortium situated in a nearby concession. To better understand these devel-
opments, Lundin decided in 1999 to commission a socio-political assessment of the area. 
The study, conducted both at the Lundin head office in Geneva and in Sudan, was based on 
an analysis of reports on the political and human rights situation in Sudan, on interviews 
with company representatives in the head office and in Sudan, and on meetings with 
members of the Government of Sudan and humanitarian organizations. It also included a 
visit to the concession area. 
The report's conclusion was that, despite the lack of evidence of a direct link between the 
sporadic fighting that had taken place in the concession area and company activities, there 
was a potential risk of deterioration if the local communities ceased to perceive the role of 
oil companies as beneficial. The report also noted that in view of the limited positive 
benefits of the oil activities at the time—revenues were not expected for a number of 
years, since activities were at the exploration stage—there was a distinct possibility that 
the local communities would grow disgruntled.9 The report's main recommendations were 
that the company should continue to monitor socio-political developments in the 
concession area and reinforce its existing relationship with the local community. 
Community relations 
From the time it started its activities in Block 5A, Lundin adopted a proactive approach to 
community relations. The company not only met with representatives of the local 
community but also sought to show goodwill towards the population by hiring local staff 
and improving the infrastructure in the area.10 The company believed that, if the local 
population obtained tangible benefits from oil activities, they would be even more 
supportive of these activities. However, given the lack of required skills locally, the number 
of people who were hired was minimal and the impact of this effort was limited. Similarly, 
while infrastructure developments such as bridge and road building increased local 
mobility, because they had been carried out for operational purposes the company did not 
consider them as community projects. 
The company therefore sought ways to make a more direct contribution to the local 
community. It initiated a number of projects, which later became an integral part of the 
company's Community Development and Humanitarian Assistance Programme (CDHAP). 
The projects had three main objectives: (a) to promote better health, hygiene, education 
and general quality of life for the current and future inhabitants of the concession area of 
Block 5A, Unity State; (b) to contribute to the economic and social development of the 
area; and (c) to reinforce relationships between the local community and the company. 
Through this programme, the company also wished to demonstrate to the local and central 
authorities that it was concerned with the interests and welfare of the population and was  
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prepared to make significant contributions, despite the fact that it would not obtain any 
revenues from its activities for a number of years. 
In order to ensure that its projects were relevant, Lundin had consulted with a number of 
local actors, in particular non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were active in the 
area. With their assistance, it identified areas of need where it felt it could make a 
contribution, such as the supply of fresh water, health, education and capacity building. 
In the three years Lundin ran CDHAP, it spent over $1.7 million on its various projects. 
These ranged from the delivery of fresh water by trucks, to the drilling of water wells and 
the construction of a water filtration unit. In the field of education, Lundin started by 
supplying educational materials to existing schools and orphanages, then built schools with 
local materials, and eventually constructed a permanent building to accommodate several 
hundred children. Through a team of five Sudanese doctors, assisted by local nurses, Lundin 
provided medical assistance in mobile tent clinics, temporary straw clinics and eventually in 
a fully equipped permanent clinic which it had built. Similarly, it relied on two veterinarians 
and local paraveterinarians whom it had trained to tend to local cattle in a vet station and 
in mobile vet clinics. The capacity-building projects included the creation of a mobile brick 
factory, a women's development centre and a nursery as well as a programme for training 
local people as midwives, paraveterinarians, nurses, brick layers, vector control specialists, 
computer analysts, and so on. In times of emergency brought about by climatic or security 
conditions, the company provided ad hoc humanitarian assistance by supplying people with 
water containers, soap, blankets, mosquito nets and medical services.11
From its inception, CDHAP was a constant element of the company's presence in Unity 
State. Not only were CDHAP staff members often the first to go to projected areas of 
activities and the last to be pulled out when the security situation deteriorated, but they 
stayed there even when operations were suspended. During the company's temporary 
suspensions of activities in 2001 and 2002, services to the community continued to be 
rendered in the two main towns of the area, Rubkona and Bentiu, and in surrounding 
villages. Maintaining its presence in the area through CDHAP was the company's way of 
demonstrating its long-term commitment to the local community and the area.12
If CDHAP was the company's most tangible way of showing its concern for the people in 
the area, it was by no means the only way. Outbreaks of fighting, coupled with allegations 
that these conflicts were related to oil, led Lundin to re-assess its role and responsibilities 
and seek ways of exercising a positive influence on the protagonists in the conflict. 
Internal review 
In the latter part of 1999, civil rights activists started to question the role of the Greater 
Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) oil consortium in the conflict.13 This 
consortium, which was operating in a concession area adjacent to Lundin's, had 
participated in the construction of a pipeline linking the southern oilfields of Unity State to 
the northern city of Port Sudan and was beginning to produce oil. Activists claimed that 
human rights violations, such as population displacement, had taken place in order to pave 
the way for the consortium's activities. The consortium consistently refuted these claims. 
The activists also believed that the revenues obtained by the Sudanese Government from 
GNPOC operations would be used to build up its military arsenal and quash the rebel 
SPLA.14
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There was a marked discrepancy between Lundin's first-hand experience in its concession 
area and reports about what was being alleged to have taken place in the neighbouring 
GNPOC concession. The report commissioned by Lundin confirmed that many elements 
distinguished the two operations. First, the GNPOC concession area was sparsely inhabited, 
which gave credence to the claim that population displacement had taken place prior to 
the commencement of operations, even though this was disproved by satellite images.15
Second, the local community there was partly of Dinka origin, the main tribal group behind 
the SPLA; it was therefore conceivable that there could be clashes between them and 
government forces. Finally, GNPOC operations had started generating revenue for the 
government, of which little, if any, appeared to be reinvested by the government in the 
area.
Despite these differences, Lundin recognized that negative perceptions of the effects of oil 
operations could also come to be applied to its area and therefore decided to set out, in a 
Code of Conduct, the conditions under which it was prepared to operate. 
The Lundin Code of Conduct 
The process of development of the Code of Conduct was important for Lundin, as it 
required the company to assess the role of its business from a different perspective. 
Lundin's management had always seen (and continues to see) itself as making a positive 
contribution to economic growth by providing a necessary source of energy. It had also 
witnessed how oil revenues in undeveloped areas acted as a catalyst for economic 
development, paving the way for other businesses and international loans.16 Lundin was 
aware of the potential negative impacts of its operations on the environment, and took 
mitigating measures to address them. The socio-political dimension of its activities, how-
ever, was not something the company had had particular reason to consider before the 
Sudan experience. It believed that these were issues beyond its field of competence. 
When faced with the possibility that its activities could have a negative impact on the 
conflict in Sudan, senior management re-examined the company's role from this wider 
perspective. Lundin established its objective to play a positive role not only directly, in the 
economic field, but indirectly in the socio-political field as well. As stated by its chairman, 
the company's 'aim is not only to find oil and gas, we are also committed to developing 
this valuable resource in the best socio-economic manner possible for the benefit of all our 
partners, including the host country and local communities'.17
The Code of Conduct was developed after the company had consulted documents in the 
field of corporate responsibility18 and after discussions with members of the Board of 
Directors as well as senior corporate and countrybased management. The Code was 
adopted as a consensus document which served as a guide for the company's activities 
worldwide.
The Code set out the company's values, responsibilities and the principles by which it was 
guided. The company recognized that it had specific responsibilities towards its 
shareholders, employees, host countries and local communities, as well as to the 
environment. It committed itself to act in a fair and honest way, to observe both national 
and international laws, and 'to act in accordance with generally accepted principles on the 
protection of human rights and the environment'.19 After the Code of Conduct had been 
adopted by the Board, Lundin disseminated it to its employees in Geneva and in Sudan,  
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and to the company's affiliates. It became an integral part of the company's contracts of 
employment.
The adoption of the Code was followed by other initiatives, such as the publication of the 
company's policies on health and safety, the environment and community relations. The 
company also arranged for an awareness session on human rights and developed a human 
rights primer, explaining the origins of and guiding principles for the protection of human 
rights and how they relate to business. The company's security liaison personnel in Sudan 
were provided with information regarding human rights and security, to sensitize them to 
such issues in conflict situations, and were encouraged to report any violations they wit-
nessed.20
The internal dissemination of the Code of Conduct was necessary in order to ensure that 
the staff understood what the company stood for and what was expected of each and 
every one of them. It also became the basis for discussions with stakeholder groups in 
Sudan.
Stakeholder engagement 
In the course of developing its Code of Conduct, the company defined more precisely who 
its stakeholders were in relation to its activities in Sudan. In the first few years of its 
operations in Sudan, it had cultivated friendly relations with business partners, government 
representatives at the central and local levels, and community representatives. It also had 
informal relations with other oil companies and NGOs active in the area. However, it 
decided, that in view of the competing claims being made about the impact of oil in the 
region, it needed not only to widen the scope of these contacts but also to alter the content 
of its discussions to include socio-political issues. 
The company's early consultations with central and local authorities had revealed a shared 
view that oil represented a momentous opportunity for the development of the country and 
the area. Even the humanitarian and development organizations it had consulted at the 
time recognized this potential, but they remained more reserved as to whether the wealth 
produced would be properly shared among the population. 
This general consensus began to erode, however, when representatives of the local 
communities whom Lundin had met at the outset accused the Sudanese Government of 
reneging on its commitments under the Khartoum Peace Agreement and decided to resign 
from their governmental posts. Their decision, coupled with the defection of a local tribal 
faction to the SPLA, represented a turning point both in the conflict and for the company. 
Interfactional fighting escalated into a conflict which pitted against each other militias that 
were backed by the two contenders in the civil war—the Government of Sudan and the 
SPLA.
Judging the situation as representing an undue risk to the safety of its staff—the SPLA 
having then indicated that it considered oil operations and staff as legitimate military 
targets—Lundin decided to temporarily suspend its operations. It made its resumption of 
activities conditional upon a peaceful environment, noting that this could only be achieved 
with the support of the local community. 
Lundin also decided to enhance its knowledge of the situation by consulting not only those 
with whom it had formal relations, such as its partners in the consortium and the 
government, but also those with particular knowledge of, or interest in, the conflict in  
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Sudan. The purpose of these discussions was to share information and opinions about the 
conflict and to establish what was required for company operations to resume. 
The institutions with which the company met included the following: 
The Sudanese Government (host government) and the Government of Unity State (local 
government)
Discussions with the Sudanese and local governments focused on the means to render the 
area conducive to oil operations. The company expressed its view that the long-term 
security required for sustainable oil activities could only be achieved with the support of the 
local community. Lundin made it clear that, in its view, military action—except for 
defensive purposes—was not an acceptable option. 
The Nuer opposition (local community) 
In its discussions with representatives of the Nuer opposition, the company attempted to 
convey its view that oil presented the best opportunity to achieve sustainable peace and 
growth in the area and encouraged them to seek a peaceful way to assert their rights to 
the area. 
The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (home government) 
It was important for Lundin, as a Swedish company, to share with the Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) its views about the situation in Sudan and its approach there. Given 
the allegations about wrongdoings committed in its area of operations, the company kept 
the MFA informed of its first-hand experience in the area and the steps taken to address 
local needs and concerns. As a member of the European Union, Sweden had adopted a 
policy of constructive engagement in Sudan: the activities of the company fell within this 
approach, in so far as it ensured that its activities were not affecting the conflict negatively. 
United Nations relief organizations (the humanitarian community) 
UN organizations were present in Sudan mainly to deliver humanitarian assistance under 
the umbrella organization Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).21 Set up both in Khartoum to 
service government-controlled areas and in Lokichoggio, Kenya, to service parts of the 
country under SPLA control, the OLS had witnessed the unbearable toll of the war on 
civilians. Its main concern was to have full access to all areas of the country in order to be 
able to provide humanitarian relief in the case of crises. As the company had itself offered 
assistance to internally displaced people fleeing from areas of natural or man-made catas-
trophe, it shared the view of the OLS that unrestricted humanitarian access was required 
and raised this issue in its meetings with government and Nuer representatives. 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
The UN Commission on Human Rights had two representatives for Sudan: an in-country 
representative, whose role was to promote respect for human rights by the Sudanese 
Government and in government-controlled areas; and a Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Sudan, whose role was to assess and report on the human rights 
situation throughout the country. In 1999 the Special Rapporteur claimed that oil activities 
had exacerbated the conflict, although he had not visited the oilfields or even consulted 
with the oil companies. Lundin therefore contacted him to inform him of its first-hand  
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experience and knowledge of the situation in the area and invited him to visit the oilfields 
instead of relying on secondary, sometimes biased, sources. The eventual visit of the 
Special Rapporteur to the area took place at such a time and was of such short duration (a 
mere three hours) that he could not conduct an in-depth inspection. In the course of 
discussions with company representatives, however, he admitted that the civil war was the 
cause of the human rights problems and that oil, if properly channelled, could contribute to 
a sustainable peace. 
Non-governmental organizations 
The NGOs with a focus on Sudan may be categorized in two broad groups: (a) those which 
have a permanent presence in Sudan, and assist the population through local humanitarian 
or development projects; and (b) those which are based outside Sudan, and promote 
special interests such as human rights, religious rights, development rights, and so on. 
Lundin was in contact with both groups to exchange views about the situation in Sudan 
and means to improve it. Not surprisingly, it found that organizations with a humanitarian 
focus were generally supportive of the company's efforts to contribute to the local com-
munities in its area of operations. They were prepared to talk to company representatives 
and even work with them on certain projects. When the stigma surrounding oil activities 
became significant, most chose not to be publicly associated with the company and 
therefore only a few cooperative ventures continued, on a confidential basis. 
Lundin's experience with special-interest NGOs was more difficult. In many cases, views 
about the situation in Sudan were so very different that discussions rarely went beyond 
each side trying to convince the other of the correctness of its views. This was particularly 
true with respect to religious-based organizations, which characterized the conflict as an 
attempt by Muslims to eradicate the Christian population in the south of Sudan in order to 
gain access to the oil there. Although the company responded to their claims, in discussions 
and in writing, it felt that not much would be gained from this effort. These NGOs believed 
that the cessation of oil activities was a means to achieve peace, while the company 
believed that oil activities would be the basis for peace.22
There were two notable exceptions in Lundin's relations with special-interest groups: 
Amnesty International, particularly the Swedish branch; and the Church of Sweden. Both 
organizations believed in the benefits of constructive engagement with companies 
operating in Sudan and met with Lundin on a number of occasions. Lundin invited their 
representatives to visit its concession area, but because of its suspension of oil activities 
and later sale of the asset the visits never materialized. Nonetheless, some of these groups' 
views and recommendations were taken into consideration and, where appropriate, were 
integrated into Lundin's business conduct.23
Think tanks 
The think tanks which had been following and reporting on Sudan for a number of years 
also considered how oil could act as an incentive for peace in Sudan.24 Above and beyond 
the obvious positive benefits of oil for the overall economic performance of the country, 
they were interested in ascertaining whether oil could be used as a peace incentive. 
Discussions with representatives of think tanks were dedicated to a review of oil 
exploration, production and revenue distribution schemes. It was generally accepted that a 
fair distribution of oil resources was a necessary condition for peace, and in this regard the 
company drew their attention to the equitable sharing scheme laid out in the Khartoum 
Peace Agreement. 
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The media (representing public interest) 
When allegations of a possible connection between the war and Lundin's operations 
surfaced in the press, the company decided that the best way to respond was to invite both 
Swedish and international journalists to visit its concession area. Until that time, journalists 
who had reported from the field had been able to do so only with the support of rebel 
forces; their reports therefore presented only one side of the story. The company believed 
that if they had the opportunity to visit the area without support or interference from either 
rebel or government forces, they would have a more balanced and realistic view of the 
situation. A number of journalists took up the company's suggestion and visited the area in
2001 and 2002. They produced articles for the press as well as video recordings that were 
aired on both Swedish and Swiss television. 
Peace negotiators 
As a principle, Lundin refrains from getting involved in the political affairs of a country; it 
believes that it cannot make a meaningful contribution in this sphere and prefers to restrict 
itself to its commercial mission. The situation it encountered in Sudan, however, was 
exceptional, and the company needed to make clear to the protagonists in the conflict that 
it saw peace as the best means to ensure sustainable oil operations. In this endeavour it 
relied on the skills and competence of Carl Bildt, a member of Lundin Petroleum's Board of 
Directors, whose experience as the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans in 
1999–2001 was particularly relevant. In a series of trips to Brussels, Cairo, Khartoum, 
Nairobi and Washington, Bildt met with high-level representatives of the Sudanese 
Government, including the President, his peace adviser, the Minister of Energy and Mining, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the main representative of the Nuer community (later 
deputy chairman of the SPLA), as well as with representatives of the key nations acting as 
peace mediators, such as Kenya, Norway, the UK and the USA. Bildt delivered the same 
message to all: oil represented an incentive for peace in so far as oil activities could not be 
pursued in a war context. He also underlined how oil provided the material basis for a 
sustainable peace. The company's repeated suspensions of activities were a proof that oil 
activities could not flourish in a conflict situation, and experience in various other countries 
demonstrated that a conflict of this nature could not be resolved militarily. In Bildt's view, 
the parties had to determine for themselves their minimum, not maximum, requirements 
for the achievement of peace. The mediators' role was to help the parties achieve this 
compromise by offering them support, in the form of international monitoring and 
monetary assistance for purposes of reconstruction. 
Lessons learned 
During the seven years in which it acted as operator of Block 5A in southern Sudan, Lundin 
was faced with a constantly changing environment. The company learned that, despite its 
desire to restrict itself to a commercial role, it could not ignore either the socio-political 
developments in its area of operations or the claims—even if unfounded—of a possible 
connection between its activities and the conflict. 
A reaffirmation of its values in a Code of Conduct, a greater involvement in community life, 
stakeholder engagement and the suspension of activities were the tools adopted by the 
company in response to the challenges it faced. 
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In the spring of 2003, the company sold its interest in Block 5A at a profit. The transaction 
was satisfying not only from a commercial perspective but also from the perspective of 
corporate responsibility. At the time the company left, active peace negotiations were 
under way and its community development programme was maintained by its successor. 
This reinforced Lundin's belief that it is possible for business to pursue commercial 
objectives while meeting ethical concerns, even in areas of conflict. 
This document was prepared for publication as a chapter in Bailes, A.J.K. and Frommelt, I. 
(eds), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Business and Security: 
Public-Private Sector Relationships in a New Security Environment (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, forthcoming 2004). SIPRI kindly granted permission to include the article in this 
Conference Paper. 
Notes
1 On the independent Swedish oil and gas exploration and production company Lundin 
Petroleum AB — hereafter referred to as Lundin, or the company — see 
URL http://www.lundin-petroleum.com/. Lundin was the operator of Block 5A on behalf of 
the consortium which included OMV (Sudan) Exploration GmbH, Petronas Carigali Overseas 
Sdn Bhd and Sudapet. For a map showing the location of Block 5A, see URL 
http://www.lundin-petroleum.com/eng/sudan3.shtml.
2 For an account of recent developments in this conflict see Wiharta, S. and Anthony, I., 
'Major armed conflicts', SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 101–104. At the time of writing, peace 
negotiations held under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) were in their final phase and a comprehensive agreement was expected to be 
signed by the end of the year. On the peace process see 'Sudan: peace talks, humanitarian 
action', URL http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/sudan/default.asp; and Powell, C. L., 'An 
opportunity for peace in Sudan', 28 Oct. 2003, URL http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/
7274.html.
3 For a discussion of Sudan's economy and the positive impact of oil in the past few years 
see the US Department of Energy Internet site at URL http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
sudan.html.
4 The current phase of peace negotiations originated with the activities of Senator John 
Danforth, who was appointed by President George W. Bush as Special Envoy for Peace in 
Sudan on 6 Sep. 2001. See Danforth, J. C., 'Report to the President of the United States on 
the outlook for peace in Sudan, April 26, 2002', at URL http://www.sudan.net (under 
'Latest news', 'Press releases and commentary', posted on 14 May 2002). The oil issue and 
the means for resolving the conflict are also discussed there. 
5 Because of Sudan's perceived connection with international terrorism, the UN and the 
USA imposed sanctions against Sudan, the former through a travel ban on Sudanese 
officials and the latter in the form of a ban on the conduct of business in the country by US 
companies.
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6 The company met with Dr Riek Machar, who, pursuant to the 1997 Khartoum Peace 
Agreement, was Vice-President of Sudan and President of the South Sudan Co-ordinating 
Council (the government representative for the south); with Taban Deng Gai, the Governor 
of Unity State; and with representatives of the local factions. 
7 The text of the Khartoum Peace Agreement, signed in Apr. 1997, is available at URL 
http://www.sudani.co.za/Documents%20and%20Issues/Khartoum%20Peace%20Agreemen
t.htm. It was signed between the Government of the Sudan, the South Sudan United 
Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF)—comprising the South Sudan Independence Movement 
(SSIM) and the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP)—the SPLM, the Equatoria Defence 
Force (EDF), and the South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG). 
8 The main tribe in the area is the Nuer tribe, which has 5 sub-groups: the Bul, Lek, Jikany, 
Jagei and Dok Nuer. In turn, these groups are affiliated with local militia. 
9 Oil exploration and production are by nature a long-term activity: it takes a number of 
years before oil is found, and several more before it is brought into production and sold. It 
therefore takes years for revenue from oil to accrue to an area, which, in the meantime, has 
observed construction activity, equipment being brought in, and teams of people going 
back and forth. In many areas of the world, this poses no particular problem, but in an area 
like southern Sudan, where the majority of the population live in very precarious 
conditions, this issue requires special attention. 
10 The uniqueness of Lundin's approach did not go unnoticed. Indeed, in a meeting with 
representative of an international NGO, Dr Riek Machar, who had then defected from the 
Government of Sudan, stated that Lundin was different in that it had consulted with the 
local people and tried to involve them in its activities. 
11 For a review of CDHAP activities in 2001–2002 see URL http://www.lundin-
petroleum.com/eng/comdev.shtml.
12 This commitment has been passed on to Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd, Lundin's 
successor in the area, which has decided not only to pursue projects initiated by Lundin but 
also to expand the activities under CDHAP. 
13 The GNPOC was at the time a consortium of Chinese, Malaysian, Canadian and Sudanese 
companies.
14 The consortium contested these allegations. It provided evidence of population growth in 
the area and divulged the nature of its discussions with the government regarding the use 
of its facilities for military purposes. 
15 The Canadian company in the consortium hired Kalagate Imagery Bureau, a British 
company specialized in the analysis of satellite images, to ascertain population patterns in 
its concession area in the 1980s and 1990s. The conclusions were that there was no 
evidence of appreciable population migration from the area. 
16 It had felt this way about Sudan, and in many ways it turned out to be right. Over a 
period of 5 years Sudan shed its pariah nation status and became an attractive place for the 
international business community (sanctioned by the International Monetary Fund). 
17 Code of Conduct, 'Message from the Chairman'. The text of the Lundin Code of Conduct 
and related documents are available at URL http://www.lundin-petroleum.com/Documents/
ot_lupe-code_e.pdf.
18 These include the Caux Principles, the Global Sullivan Principles, the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Labour Organization's Tripartite Declaration of Principle 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development's Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Amnesty 
International's Human Rights Code for Companies, the Prince of Wales Business Forum on 
Operating in Conflict Zones, and so on. 
19 Code of Conduct (note 17). 
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20 The relevant personnel received information about the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights for the Extractive Sector, available at URL http://www.amnesty.org.uk/
business/newslet/spring01/principles.shtml; Amnesty International's 10 Basic Human Rights 
Standards for Law Enforcement Officials, URL http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/
aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/POL300041998ENGLISH/$File/POL3000498.pdf; the 1990 UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, URL 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp43.htm; and the 1979 UN Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials, URL http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp42.htm.
21 At that time, the OLS was comprised of 42 intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
development and humanitarian organizations, among which were the UN Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP). 
22 In Mar. 2001 Lundin posted a report on its Internet site 'Lundin in Sudan' which 
described company activities to date and responded to allegations regarding the nature of 
the conflict in its area of operations. 
23 Amnesty International (AI) had issued recommendations for oil companies operating in 
Sudan; these were circulated among relevant company staff, as were copies of the 10 Basic 
Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement Officials (note 20). 
24 Two US-based think tanks devoted particular attention to this issue: the Center for 
Strategic International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC; and the Carter Center Peace 
Program, Atlanta, Georgia. 
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5 Petroleum Development in Chad: 
Potential for Conflict 
Gilbert Maoundonodji 
There is an obvious correlation between oil and violent conflicts. Yet one may well wonder 
whether this causal link is a verified and verifiable one, yesterday as today, here as 
elsewhere, and regardless of the analytical or research approach taken. In other words, 
does this causal relationship exist, and does it apply to the case of the oil project in Chad? 
If so, why do the project sponsors, the World Bank in particular, believe they can make it a 
development project, given the inherent and perhaps unavoidable conflict potential? Before 
developing my argument on this crucial question, I should like to put forward two research 
perspectives that could help shed more light on the connection between oil and violent 
conflicts. I will base my discussion of the petroleum development project in Chad on these 
perspectives. They are the geopolitical perspective and that of the political economy of 
conflicts in Africa. 
Geopolitical perspective 
A review of the literature from a geopolitical perspective shows that there is a clear link 
between oil and conflict: "La Guerre secrète pour le pétrole. La guerre froide du pétrole. Le 
monde secret du pétrole. L'épopée du pétrole. L'empire du pétrole. Le pétrole roi du 
monde. Le pétrole et le pouvoir mondial. Oil the biggest business. Les Emirats mirages. Les 
émirs de la République, Tintin au pays de l'or noir, and the like. These highly emotive titles 
best reflect the fantasies and dreams stirred by oil in people's imaginations. These include 
the spectacular enrichment of oil industry magnates (Rockefeller or Deterding, to mention 
some of the most influential pioneers); that of enormous power, able to make and break 
the governments of Mexico, Venezuela or elsewhere (some countries in Africa and the Elf 
Aquitaine plots1), to bend the will of political leaders in Washington, London or Paris.2
Thanks to their secret ties, Les hommes du pétrole3 [The Oil Men] can dominate the world, 
impose on it the prices agreed between them, divide amongst themselves oilfields as large 
as some States, easily circumvent national regulations, secure the most favourable tax 
treatment, and goad States into military action against recalcitrant parties. They are held 
responsible for the shady assassinations of their adversaries, for silences bought at 
exorbitant prices and for starting wars and imposing their peace terms.4 Hence the 
correlation between oil and violent conflicts, seen from the geopolitical perspective. 
Perspective of the political economy 
From the angle of the political economy of conflicts in Africa, Mamadou Koulibaly writes5
that this region of the world is a matter of constant concern to the international 
community, whether for the way it handles its economic policy or because of its wars and 
their implications in terms of refugees. According to this author, Africa is very often seen as 
the continent where the people are not only ignorant of how to implement the structural 
adjustment programmes imposed on them, but also – and even more so – of how to feed 
themselves or take responsibility for the consequences of their mistakes and their political 
and economic incompetence. Hence the argument that conflicts in Africa are born of the 
poor management of the economies. Contrary to this argument, good governance can 
reduce the probability of violent conflict. Many working hypotheses have been formulated 
to support this argument and to draw attention to the economic stakes in Africa's conflicts. 
I will focus mainly on three hypotheses put forward by Mamadou Koulibaly:6
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First hypothesis 
The strategic considerations of the rich industrialised countries with their commercial and 
humanitarian corollaries are a source of conflict in Africa. Several examples are evidence 
for this hypothesis, which is true of the Chadian oil project as well. 
Indeed, on 3 August 1959, the Government of the French Republic and the Government of 
the Republic of Chad signed a protocol that included a provision about exploiting "sensitive 
resources", especially oil. Under one of its clauses, Chad could not use these resources 
without France's agreement. 
France's secret agenda was therefore to exploit Chad's oil in the year 2000. Yet officially, at 
the time, the French authorities declared that Chad's subsoil was poor. The first President 
of the Republic of Chad, François Tombalbaye, had to "stumble" upon a geological map 
made by the French engineers of the Directorate for Geological and Mining Exploration 
(Direction des Recherches Géologiques et Minières, DRGM) of the French National Center 
for Scientific Research (CNRS) before realising that Chadian oil was part of France's power 
politics.
On the basis of this famous map, the Government of Chad turned to the United States. A 
permit was thus granted to Continental Oil Company (CONOCO) in 1969. The company 
made its first oil find in the mid-1970s. The first well was inaugurated in December 1974. 
At the time of inauguration of this well, then-President François Tombalbaye said (in 
private), "I've just signed my death warrant." Less than six months later, on 13 April 1975, 
he was assassinated in a military coup. Was this at the instigation of the French secret 
services? And yet, President F. Tombalbaye had taken all the precautions by advising the 
French authorities, as shown by the communication in the text box below. 
The political instability following the various armed uprisings and the 1979 civil war 
prevented the resumption of the project. It was only in 1988 that former President Hisseine 
Habre was able to revive it. An agreement was signed on 19 December that same year with 
EXXON, CHEVRON and SHELL, an 80% US-British consortium. Two years later, on 1 
December 1990, Hisseine Habré was driven from power by Idriss Deby his former Chief of 
the Defence Staff, who is now President of the Republic of Chad. 
Idriss Deby put the project back on track. In February 1992, immediately after he returned 
from a visit to Paris, he signed a decree allowing the French company ELF to join the 
consortium. Now, eleven years later, Idriss Deby is still in power, this time with the 
blessings of Paris and Washington. He will be staying there, even after his current (and 
officially last) term of office, provided that he guarantees the interests of France and the 
United States. 
Second hypothesis 
Conflicts are engendered by disastrous economic situations and by poverty. In poor African 
economies, conflicts will stem from the poor distribution of income and the fruits of 
economic activity, social injustice in the distribution of aid and hence from the chaotic 
relations between Africa and the rest of the world. 
One of the major arguments of this hypothesis is that the inequalities in the distribution of 
income, rights of ownership and hence of power are sources of conflict in the same way as 
public development aid. The exacerbation of inequalities is increasing the
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number of conflicts. Besides, the more intolerable the inequalities, the greater the risk of 
conflict.
The recurring conflicts in Chad are no doubt the outcome of the low level of economic 
development and the situation of poverty and destitution prevalent since independence. 
Yet as I showed earlier, these socio-economic variables do not explain everything. 
Economic and political reforms can only reduce, but not solve the conflicts in Africa. 
Third hypothesis 
The problem of conflicts in Africa can be solved through economic and political reforms. 
However, their hypothesis cannot be verified mutatis mutandis. The structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) advocated by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) – the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank – are cases in point. 
The President of the Republic of Chad 
Fort-Lamy 5 September 1969 
N°90/PR/CAB.
His Excellency President Georges Pompidou 
President of the French Republic 
Elysée Palace 
Mr. President, 
True to the traditional friendship that binds our two countries, I have the honour to
inform you of the project that is now receiving the attention of the Government of Chad
as well as my own: exploring for liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons in Chad. 
We have just received an application from a US company (Continental Overseas Oil
Company) for a permit to conduct explorations for hydrocarbons in the Lake Chad Basin
and in the Doba basin (Chari). 
Mr. President, apart from the Doba basin where ORSTOM (Institute of Scientific
Research for Development in Cooperation) has undertaken very superficial preliminary
studies, no French company has done any exploration in these two regions. 
As I have stated, I am particularly keen to inform you of this, for strategic reasons and
out of respect for the Franco-Chadian agreements in these specific fields. 
The Government of Chad and I would sincerely have preferred this to be undertaken by
French entities. Unfortunately, the example of Pétropas in Tibesti, where that company
found nothing after such costly explorations, would not encourage other French
companies to become involved in Chad. It is against this backdrop that the Government
of Chad and I have considered it appropriate to approve this request, which to our mind
will encourage other companies to do likewise. 
Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. 
F. TOMBALBAYE 
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Several evaluations show that the SAPs being implemented since the late 1970s have not 
solved the problem for which they were initiated. The SAPs were originally instituted to 
enable Africa's economies to meet their international commitments and repay their debt, 
not to reduce poverty and generate development. Unfortunately, the SAPs have 
compounded social conflicts and the African states which are subject to these programmes 
have now become beggar states living from handouts and official loans. 
Through a succession of semantic shifts (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility and so on) the Bretton Woods Institutions are attempting to 
substantiate the argument that economic and political reforms can settle the matter of 
conflicts in Africa. Indeed, through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the BWIs 
propose several measures, the main ones being the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). 
Not only is Chad eligible under the HIPC Initiative, but it is also mining its oil thanks to the 
financial backing and political support of the World Bank. While minimising the political 
risk, i.e. the probability of violent conflicts associated with the realisation of this project, 
the World Bank seems to expect that exploiting Chad's oil resources is the only chance to 
lift the country out of under-development, which will in turn solve the problems of social 
inequalities and thereby reduce the potential for conflict. 
To that end, a range of legislative, regulatory and institutional precautions were taken. 
These include the infamous Law No. 001/PR/ 99 as amended by Law No. 0016/PR/ of 10 
August 2000 and its implementing decrees, and the creation of a body to oversee and 
monitor oil revenues, the Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Revenus Pétroliers 
(CCSRP). Although these measures are needed, they are neither enough to promote the 
rational use of oil resources for poverty reduction, nor can they purport to be the solution 
to potential conflicts. The geostrategic and geopolitical stakes of oil mining in Chad are 
large enough to represent permanent sources of potential conflict. 
I have already mentioned the rivalries between France and the United States through their 
multinational companies, as well as the practise of keeping leaders in office depending on 
the extent to which they satisfy the interests of one or the other power. These geostrategic 
rivalries could well intensify when we consider that due to this oil project, Chad is 
becoming a part of the geostrategic system of the United States, which intends to draw 
25% of its oil supply from Africa by 2015. 
Moreover, the Chad-Cameroon pipeline is being built not merely for Chadian oil, but above 
all to serve as a safe corridor given the upheavals associated with oil deposits in countries 
bordering on Chad, such as the northern Central African Republic, Sudan, Niger, etc. An 
arrangement of this kind also represents a source of friction amongst these countries. 
Moreover, in Chad's internal geopolitics, the oil development project is a source of friction 
both nationally and regionally. 
Argued historically and empirically, Africa's violent conflicts – past or present – have been 
and continue to be over control of natural wealth or budgets, the latter consisting mainly of 
aid. Thus, African Heads of State are often warlords and African economies the spoils of 
war. In such circumstances, good governance boils down to managing the activities of 
predators, at any price. The cleptocrat thus becomes the embodiment of the social ideal in 
African societies. 
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Is the situation in Chad any different from that? Yesterday, as today, both the quality of 
governance and the political behaviour of leaders do not prove the contrary. Oil revenues 
will be the principal stake in the political rivalries between national and local elites. 
Keeping the present leaders in power, gaining power, governing and wielding power will 
be the hallmarks of the confrontations between these two elite groups. 
Conclusion
The absence of democracy and rule of law in a country such as Chad are constraints on the 
Bank's poverty-reduction policies and strategies. How do we break this vicious circle? 
Notes
1 The French oil multinational Elf-Aquitaine is accused, amongst other things, of having 
provoked the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville (5 June-25 October 1997) because then-
President Pascal Lissouba had refused to offer an oil concession in favour of the US 
multinational Oxy. This explains Elf-Aquitaine's support for the former President Denis 
Sassou Nguesso, who regained power by force after a fratricidal and deadly civil war 
(4,000-10,000 killed, Source: annuaire économique et géopolitique mondial, 1999, p. 159). 
The mafia-like dealings of Elf-Aquitaine led to the creation of a movement in France called 
"Elf must not lay down the law in Africa" [Elf ne doit pas faire la loi en Afrique]. 
2 André Noushi, Pétrole et relations internationales depuis 1945, Paris, Armand Colin, 1999, 
p. 7. 
3 Daniel Yergin, Les hommes du pétrole. Les fondateurs 1859-1945, Paris, Stock, 1991. 
4 André Noushi, op. cit., p. 7. 
5 Mamadou Koulibaly, Enjeux économiques, conflits africains et relations internationales, 
Africa Development, Vol. XXIV, Nos 3 & 4, 1999.
6 Idem, Op. cit. 
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6 Petroleum and Violent Conflicts: 
Strategies for Industrialized Countries 
Rudolf Rechsteiner1
In a little over a century petroleum has grown into the most widely traded commodity in 
the world, into the source of unparalleled wealth for many, into a must-have necessity – 
some say, a narcotic - for others, and into one of the premier drivers of violent international 
conflicts around the world. The latter role is becoming the overarching one in this still new 
century because the Earth has already given up much of its oil riches, and narcotic users 
tend to become panicky when supplies run low. 
Many theories have been spawned regarding petroleum in the ground and its practical 
availability above ground. The most successful one came from the US oil geologist Marion 
King Hubbert, who in 1956 predicted that US oil production would peak in 1970 and 
decline thereafter. 
Diagram 1: Hubbert Curve2
The "Hubbert Curve" illustrated above demonstrates empirical experience based on 
geology and statistics: The practical availability of a region's oil reserves over time 
describes a Gaussian (Normal) Curve. Large fields are discovered first, small ones later. 
After exploration and initial growth in output, production plateaus and eventually declines 
to zero. Until 1970 Hubbert was ridiculed and denounced by the US Administration and the 
oil industry. However, his theories proved exactly correct; beginning in 1971 US oil 
production declined and has maintained this downward trend steadily. 
In the 1950's Hubbert predicted that global oil production would peak around the turn of 
the century. OPEC's capping of output for some two decades delayed the peak somewhat 
compared with Hubbert's original prediction. Nevertheless, Hubbert's empirically derived 
forecasting methods have stood the test of time. Even today new exploration and 
production technologies can alter, but not undo, the limits dictated by geology. The bell-
shaped output curves can be discerned both for major fields and entire regions. 
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Diagram 2: Samotlor3
Samotlor is Russia's largest oilfield. Oil production is declining steadily despite the 
deployment of modern secondary and tertiary production technology. 
Diagram 3: US oil production (without Alaska)4
The same holds true for US oil output in the lower 48 States.  (US-production without 
Alaska). The decline in output was only slowed somewhat by tapping off shore and deep-
sea oil deposits in the Gulf of Mexico. A steep decline in output is also to be expected 
there, roughly after 2010. 
Diagram 4. Diagram 5: Oil production in Alaska5 and Norway6
Alaska and Norway present a similar picture. Production patterns for individual oilfields are 
particularly well portrayed in the chart for Norway. Each of these oilfields describes its own 
Hubbert Curve, in which the pace of new development and the timing of the peak follow 
different patterns, but always end up in a steady contraction of production. 
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Diagram 6: United Kingdom7
In the case of the United Kingdom, precise data for the output of individual oil fields are 
well known: the dip in the middle of the picture is due to the Piper Alpha oil platform fire. 
The all-time peak was reached in 1999 with an average of 2.68 million barrels a day. Since 
then, production has diminished by 23%, or 6.0 % per annum to 2.073 mbd.8 This figure 
conveys some idea of the changes to be expected when world oil production peaks. Shown 
by the punctured line in this picture are the optimistic production forecasts of the US 
Energy Information Agency (EIA). They are also frequently disseminated as such by the 
Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Diagram7: ASPO forecast, all liquids9
In the view of the "Association for the Study of the Peak of Oil and Gas" (ASPO)10 - an 
association of critical oil geologists - it will be possible to increase global oil production 
only until roughly 2010. Thereafter, production increases from new oilfields will no longer 
offset production declines in old fields, let alone contribute to further growth. Given the 
growth in demand of 1-2% per year hitherto, stagnating oil production already poses a 
serious challenge. 
Some increases in output will come from deep-sea oil (Gulf of Mexico, West Africa, South 
China), from the polar regions (Alaska, Alberta, Siberia, Sakhalin) and from the Caspian  
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Sea. In the "old" production zones outside the Persian Gulf region, output is declining. 
Globally, 27 billion barrels of oil are currently being extracted annually, whereas new finds 
amount to a mere 3-6 billion barrels per annum.11 Present oil production will hardly be able 
to remain at this high level beyond the year 2010. Oil will indeed continue to flow for 
another 75 to 100 years, but in steadily declining quantities. 
Diagram 8: Explorations (yellow line) and net increase in oil reserves12
It is inevitable that oil prices will start to rise significantly, but this will not lead to 
significant increases in production. As early as the 1970s it had already been realized that 
despite high real prices of over $100/b (in 2003 dollars), additional drilling could not 
increase the number of actual finds. Instead, for years now there has been a deficit 
between new oil discovery and oil consumption, which is drastically depleting real reserves. 
Diagram 9: Post-peak countries13
All the increases in production in Russia, West Africa or Alaska are not enough to 
compensate for the contraction in oil output in the numerous countries (mostly non-Opec) 
that have already passed their peak (Diagram 9). By 2010 these countries outside the 
Middle East OPEC countries will suffer a shortfall of some 10 million b/d, or about one-
eighth of current world oil output. To maintain present world production rates this shortfall 
would need to be made up by additional production in the Middle East. 
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Diagram 10: Overall availability of oil by origin: already being worked, still 
existing reserves and expected increase in reserves by 205014
The remaining reserves are distributed geographically in a highly unbalanced manner. 
North America, originally almost as oil-rich as Saudi Arabia, by now has nearly exhausted 
its oil riches. The additional reserves often alleged to be enormous in the form of shale and 
tar or oil sands are not equivalent to reserves of liquid oil. The extraction of oil from sands 
or shale consumes huge amounts of energy and causes serious environmental damage and 
pollution. Therefore these supposedly gigantic reserves can contribute only modestly to the 
overall supply --- at most 20% of North American consumption. 
For the industrial countries to maintain oil consumption at the customary levels requires 
massive increases in Middle Eastern oil output. An important non-technical factor comes 
into play here: Islam. Of the roughly 1,000 billion barrels of conventional oil reserves 
remaining, two-thirds are located in Muslim countries, 260 billion barrels in Saudi Arabia 
alone, compared with 22 billion barrels in the USA. The continuation of its extravagant 
energy consumption makes the US dependent on the economic and political dynamics of 
the Islamic world. The actual on-going supply of oil is not just a matter of the size of 
reserves but is driven by the price levels and by policy decisions regarding what is a 
desirable output today versus tomorrow. Add to this the difficulty of accurately determining 
the scale of oil reserves there. In the OPEC countries the methodology for estimating oil 
reserves is a well-guarded government secret. When expectation for prices are turning 
higher, some countries tend to restrict output in order to ensure bigger oil revenues in the 
future.
Given the still low real prices of oil and the existing upside potential, many countries have 
an interest in restricting output and assuring the local population a bigger share in oil 
income. This is a prime motive of recent riots in Nigeria and Bolivia, of the policies of the 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, and of shut-off of oil exports by guerrillas in Iraq. 
The inability of the USA, to change their wasteful American Way of Life in favor of a 
sustainable lifestyle is the chief reason for US aggression and occupation in the Middle East 
and Central Asia. Naturally, it is also about oil company profits, the interests of the US 
automotive industry and the imperialist aims of the Israeli Government (annexation of West 
Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights). But the inner circle within the US government that 
sets the agenda mainly is composed of former oil industry executives and this is what is 
sparking the conflict between the West and the Islamic countries. 
Under George W. Bush the word "terrorist" has become the code for Islam, for a religion 
with over one billion believers. Since its very beginnings, Islam has pursued strong social  
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objectives and has developed its own moral code aimed at preventing extreme poverty 
among its own people. It is therefore no chance matter that Osama bin Laden's declared 
demands include higher oil prices ("144 dollar a barrel") and the withdrawal of the US 
army from Islamic countries. 
Conflict between East and West will in future revolve increasingly around oil prices. For 
many years following the collapse of the OPEC cartel in 1985, prices fluctuated between 
$15 and $20, corresponding to 10-15 US cents/liter, a very low level in real terms. For 
decades oil was two to four times cheaper than Coca Cola! 
A new situation has been developing since the year 2000, however. As a direct outcome of 
declining production in the North Sea and Alaska and due to rising demand from Asia, 
OPEC has regained price leadership and - as in the 1973-85 period - is now using its quota 
decisions to set the band for oil prices. 
Diagram 11: OPEC production quotas and oil price trends15
Thanks to the new quota discipline, the price range has been gradually raised from a 1999 
low of $10 to more than $30. This means that the oil bill has more than doubled for the 
wasteful US and other importing countries. The price decline that many oil analysts had 
expected in the aftermath of the Iraq war has not materialized. Instead, the official Opec 
price range was quietly raised from $22-28 to $28-35/b during the 2003/2004 winter, partly 
to offset the lower value of the US-dollar. 
Terrorist attacks on export pipelines and local resistance against occupying forces in Iraq 
have been highly successful in at least two ways, 1) by directly interrupting the flow of oil, 
and 2) by deterring fresh investments in the oil infrastructure. And, most likely, the US has 
lost appetite for new armed incursions into oil-lands, for example Iran or Saudi Arabia, 
because such ventures would certainly reduce, rather than increase the flow of oil to the 
industrialized world. It would be no surprise if oil prices surpassed $50/b by early 2005. As 
a consequence, efforts to improve energy efficiency and to tap renewable sources of energy 
are taking on greater importance in oil importing countries. 
These higher oil prices mean new and enormous money transfers from the first world to the 
Middle East and to Russia, improving the economic base in many medium-size oil-
producing countries, which in turn tends to increase the demand for oil and natural gas of 
the local populations in those countries. The new oil market conditions also are enabling 
many countries better to protect themselves from US imperialist influences. It is no chance  
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matter that in awarding its latest natural gas concessions, Saudi Arabia considered oil 
companies from China, Italy and Russia, but not from the USA. This greater self-confidence 
is reflected in some OPEC member's demands for payment of its oil invoices in Euros or in 
other currencies more solid than US dollars. 
Diagram 12: Oil price and excess production capacity16
The pincer movement of rising demand and dwindling reserves means that even relatively 
minor events such as strikes, a fire in a large refinery, or political unrest even in second-tier 
exporting countries can trigger major price upturns. The cushion of huge, readily accessible, 
reserves has shrunk to an all-time low during the Iraq war, some 1 million barrel/day or 
barely more than 1% of overall world consumption, and less than 2 million barrels in early 
2004.17
On March 7, 2003 ARAMCO, the Saudi national oil company announced that with an 
output of 9.2 million barrels per day the Company was at near-full capacity.18 Since then 
the Saudis' output has dropped by 0.7 million b/d. Accordingly the country has only limited 
mobilizable reserves, and many of the older super-giant oil fields such as Ghawar are in 
natural decline so that maintaining (not to mention lifting) their output entails ever greater 
costs.
This is the more remarkable as Saudi Arabia and some smaller Gulf States are the focus of 
the West's supply expectations for the coming decades. 
International Energy Agency forecasts, regularly published in "World Energy Outlook", do
merit closer scrutiny in this respect. After all, the IEA is the authoritative OECD-branch that 
advises OECD governments and makes long-term recommendations to political players. 
Statements by this government-funded institution in Paris are taken as the "truth" in the 
energy ministries of many industrialized nations. IEA-"Reference Scenarios" in fact assume 
that oil production will increase steadily by 1.6% per annum until 2030, without massive 
increase in prices: "Resources of conventional crude oil and NGLs are adequate to meet the 
projected increase in demand to 2030, although new discoveries will be needed to renew 
reserves. The importance of non-conventional sources of oil, such as oil sands and gas-to-
liquids, is nonetheless expected to grow, especially after 2020"19
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For many years now IEA puts forward the assumption that oil prices will stay low: "Crude
oil prices are assumed to remain flat until 2010 at around $21 per barrel (in year 2000 
dollars) – their average level for the past 15 years. They will then rise steadily to $29 in 
2030."20
This forecast is extremely unrealistic, for the current oil price is already above $30/b. 
Simple oil industry statistics (e.g. from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy) readily 
reveal that a large number of oil-producing countries have suffered declining outputs for 
years, even decades. These dismal results occurred even though new oil discoveries came 
along from time to time. 
According to the IEA forecast to 2020, production will rise from 76 million b/d in 2000 to 
100 million b/d in 2020 (and to even higher levels thereafter). 
However, take into account the trends in the countries with already declining output (black) 
or with outputs starting to decline by 2005 (white) and you will get a measure of what the 
Persian Gulf producers (grey) have to accomplish to meet the IEA forecast for 2020: 
1. They must produce at least at the yearly rate attained in 2000, that is, at roughly 23 
million b/d. 
2. They must compensate for the production shortfalls of post-peak countries, for 
example the UK, USA, Mexico, China or Norway. This calls for an output of an 
additional 19 million b/d. 
3. Lastly, they must produce the oil needed to satisfy the predicted growth in 
consumption --- a staggering 30 million b/d by 2020.21
Summarizing then, daily output by Persian Gulf producers must roughly triple from 23 
million to 73 million b/d in order to maintain consumption patterns and price levels 
predicted by the IEA. 
Diagram 13: International Energy Agency oil consumption prospects and the origin 
of supposed supplies22
According to the IEA's forecast of 2020 oil consumption oil production would have to rise 
by 50 million b/d. This represents a six-fold increase in Saudi Arabia's present-day 
production, and this offers a sort of yardstick for asking: Is this at all reasonable? Even 
comparing this increase with the present-day production levels of the entire Middle East we  
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wind up with the question: Can this geographic area really triple its output within the span 
of 15 years especially when considering the unavoidable delays encountered in adding new 
oil production facilities? From this follows naturally the question: Are the IEA's prospects 
grounded in reality or do they reflect an agenda for influencing the future? Indeed, the IEA 
is government-financed, suggesting impartiality, but this organization seems to be strongly 
influenced by the oil and gas industries and, in earlier days, by the nuclear industry. This 
can be recognized easily by anyone who comes into direct contact with IEA representatives 
or with their many publications. 
For decades now the IEA's coded message has been: "continue as usual, nothing can 
happen, build your airports and highways, ignore renewables and the Kyoto Agreement, for 
there will be enough oil, gas, coal, nuclear." The IEA's real mandate however is precisely to 
protect consumer countries from over-dependence on petroleum and to guarantee secure 
energy supplies at modest prices. The IEA has always interpreted this mandate as though it 
were only about tapping new countries with oil deposits and mobilizing the required 
capital. Yet even if the world still were blessed with bountiful oil reserves, the IEA's tone 
and statements deserve to be questioned on three critical levels: 
x The IEA avoids identifying the origin of the future oil supplies. Enormous estimates are 
based on "unidentified reserves" – reserves that it is hoped will still be found as prices 
rise modestly, but whose existence can be identified neither technically nor 
geographically.
x The IEA advocates the exploitation of so called unconventional oil reserves (tar sand 
oil, shale oil), yet overlooks considerations regarding the ratio of energy investment to 
energy return from these new sources. In the case of oil sands and oil shale deposits in 
Canada and Venezuela, the energy in/ energy out is rather poor and cost overruns are 
common.23 Large quantities of natural gas are needed to extract unsatisfactory 
quantities of oil. Moreover, this extraction process destroys landscapes and leads to 
enormous emissions of CO2, and this is similarly unattractive as burning more coal. 
x The IEA seems to ignore the influence of suppliers on the price of oil. Better quota 
control and the inevitable exhaustion of their finite reserves will encourage exporting 
countries to drag out production over time in the hope of getting better prices and of 
prolonging the flow of revenue from their diminishing resource. 24
The unrealistically low price estimations by the IEA ($15-$25/b even when actual prices 
have fluctuated between $10 and $70/b) distort policy-making around the world. Scenarios 
based on a variety of price levels would inevitably foster efforts toward improving energy 
efficiency and utilizing renewable energy sources, These would be the logical next step in 
contrast to considering imperialistic and even military means for gaining control of the last 
oil-rich areas. 
In addition to its hopes for continued plentiful supplies of petroleum the IEA is banking on 
the expansion in the use of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Gas production in the major 
consuming countries such as the USA, Canada, and the UK is in steep decline, making 
these countries increasingly dependent on supplies from politically unstable regions abroad. 
Reserves of gas are believed to exceed those of oil. However, because of the need for 
liquefaction (by freezing it to -161° Celsius) for ocean surface transport and the need for far 
more costly tankers and pipelines, gas is a less convenient commodity than oil. Moreover, 
ship-borne LNG is viewed as particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. 
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The price of much gas purchased under time-defined contracts is linked to the price of oil. 
As a consequence gas offers only limited economic insulation from the vagaries of oil 
prices, and this linkage also extends to some extent to the price of electricity because gas 
turbines by now are a significant factor in the generation of electricity. In the OECD 
countries domestic supplies of natural gas are expected to decline sharply after 2010, thus 
contributing to the likelihood of energy-related conflicts. 
Diagram 14: Natural Gas prices in the US 1930-200025
OECD countries currently import roughly 70% of their oil needs and this proportion will 
increase further. A growing number of erstwhile oil exporters are becoming oil importers. 
Such will be the case of Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Argentina, Colombia 
and Mexico in the coming years. 
The share of oil in overall energy consumption is between 40 and 45 per cent and that of 
natural gas some 25%. Gas is believed to be "abundant" for another 60 years from now. A 
doubling of yearly natural gas consumption over the next 10 to 15 years will cut the ratio of 
resource-to-production to less than half of its present level, a mere 30 years. This will 
dramatically affect the perceived supply security and will sharpen and broaden the conflict 
over energy supply. And it will involve not only numerous smaller supplier countries but 
also "the big players": Russia, Mid East OPEC, China, and the western industrial countries. 
Diagram 15: China: From oil exporter to one of the biggest importers26
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China dramatically influences the tensions surrounding the international supply of 
petroleum. Until 1993 China exported oil, but by 1994 its rapidly growing requirements 
forced it to import in sharply increasing quantities. By the end of 2003 domestic production 
began its inexorable decline. This, in tandem with burgeoning growth in consumption, is 
driving up China's imports with no letup in sight. 
The situation is similar in India. 
Diagram 16: Estimated possible production increases in the Persian Gulf 27
Many major oil deposits in the Persian Gulf area remain untapped. Jean Laherrère, a 
leading ASPO oil geologist, estimates that their exploitation could add 10 million b/d, 
corresponding to roughly 2% in increased worldwide consumption for about another 6 
years. Others are more cautious.28
Yet even if these estimates are in the ballpark the first signs of shortages will appear as 
early as 2010, and neither the other OPEC countries nor Russia will be in a position to 
offset the growing shortfalls. 
Diagram 17: Estimates of overall conventional oil resources29
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All the previously cited production trends conform to the Hubbert Curve and to the opinions 
of many oil geologists: The 900 billion barrels of oil produced so far slightly exceed one-half 
of the output expected from conventional oil deposits over their lifetime. Hubbert's 
empirical observations virtually dictate that stagnation and declines in output will follow. It 
may well be possible to partially offset this decline by using other liquid hydrocarbons from 
unconventional sources, but these sources are not comparable to the low hanging fruit of 
conventional petrol. 
The coming crisis is being kept in the closet by oil exporters and importers so as not to 
upset and alert consumers unduly. The oil industry has little interest in spurring consumers 
to turn to alternative fuels and to more energy-efficient technologies. "Let's not upset the 
apple cart just now, we can keep this banquet going for many more years", seems to be 
the leitmotif. There is no credible public organization providing consumers with analytical 
data regarding the real situation of oil and gas reserves. 
The downplaying of the slowly gathering crisis reflects the desire for keeping financial 
institutions less than fully informed. The oil business is a highly capital-intensive industry. 
Billions are needed annually for new exploration, for bringing new fields online, and for 
laying the pipelines and improving harbor installations to bring this liquid to market. 
Keeping the bankers and the bourses happy is a sensible objective. 
Published data on reserves are the means for doing that. Large reserves assure stability of 
supply; so lets make the estimates generous. Who can claim the figures are inflated? When 
that becomes evident years later the bankers who fell for them are probably retired and the 
estimators as well. This doesn't always work as Shell Oil experienced in early 2004. Shell 
caused a furore in investment circles by downgrading its reported Reserves by 20%, namely 
2.7 Gb for oil and 7.2 Tcf for gas, causing the shares to fall in value by about 10% in three 
days. In the wake of this disclosure the CEO and other top executives were forced out.30
In some regard, oil companies and OPEC countries have shared interests, akin to drug 
farmers and drug dealers. A switch to other energy sources would harm OPEC, as it would 
endanger demand as well as profits for oil companies. Generous estimates of reserves by 
members of OPEC for long have served another underlying purpose. OPEC's production 
quotas are parceled out among its members partly on the basis of a member's "proven" 
reserves. Large reserves entitle a large production quota. When all members resort to this 
padding the positive effect on an individual member's quota shrinks and the total reserves 
of the cartel --- on paper --- balloon. This can make the coming crisis worse when everyone 
discovers that "there is less oil in the ground then we thought" (or reported). 
Are oil-importing countries powerless in the face of the impending crisis? Not entirely. 
Reducing the consumption of fossil energy not only wards off shortages and reduces the oil 
bill but lessens problems of air pollution and global warming and of dependence on 
uncertain supplies from distant countries. 
We should therefore reduce dependence on oil and natural gas in good time and change 
over to sustainable energy systems. With a good energy policy, OECD countries can 
contribute substantially to defusing national problems and international conflicts. The most 
immediate and the cheapest way is to increase the productivity of energy within the 
importing countries themselves, in other words, improving the so-called energy efficiency. 
Buildings, households, and vehicles waste, collectively, enormous quantities of energy. 
That's where a few percentage points reduction in waste goes a long way. The Minergy
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standard in Switzerland enables cutting power consumption for new buildings in half while 
at the same time ensuring better building quality and reduced air pollution. 
Energy taxes are a major tool for reducing imports of fossil fuels. Relatively high energy 
taxes reduce OPEC's leeway for slapping on arbitrary price increases. Environmental tax 
policies can be similarly helpful. The added labor and capital used for improving energy 
efficiency is kept within the domestic economy rather than shipped abroad to pay for 
foreign oil and gas. 
Major reductions in energy usage are subject to substantial time lags. Despite attractive 
incentives the changeover can take decades. Taking positive steps early is one way of 
limiting or avoiding the "stranding" of investments in older plants, infrastructure and 
equipment as rising energy costs render them unprofitable. The US is peculiarly vulnerable 
to major increases in energy costs because of the general energy inefficiency of its 
buildings, the automobile-centered personal transportation system, the wide distribution of 
settlements with its resulting long commuting travels. A major oil crisis may well cause the 
stranding of   enormous investments in US physical plants, industrial equipment, and 
commercial buildings and may put downward pressure on the price of residences located 
far from work places. 
Diagram 18: International comparison of fuel oil prices31
Switzerland is by no means one of the environmentally leading countries in Europe. Quite 
the contrary. Our country is thwarting climate policy with its extremely low taxes on fossil 
energy such as fuel oil and petrol and is inflicting billions worth of fiscal damage to 
neighboring countries through fuel tourism. Switzerland is the country with the highest 
income and the lowest petrol and fuel oil prices in Western Europe. 
54
Diagram 19: International comparison of petrol prices32
Higher prices of fossil fuels improve the competitive standing of public transport and could 
boost energy efficient motor vehicles. 
Diagram 20: Price reduction potential of renewable energy33
Renewable energies hold enormous potential and are showing a distinct trend toward 
diminishing costs. Reducing the use of conventional energy in favor of alternative 
renewables does not lead to a worsening of the quality of life, but rather to an 
improvement. Energy prices in Europe and Japan are higher than in the US and per capita 
energy consumption is only one-half the level of the US. However, Europeans and Japanese 
do not suffer a quality of life inferior to Americans'. On the contrary, life expectancy - 
perhaps the most reliable yardstick for the quality of life - is higher than for Americans. 
Moreover, the damaging aspects of motorized vehicle traffic - congestion, noise, air 
pollution and crime - are lower than in the US. 
If we press ahead with the serious development of renewables we can in time cover 
Switzerland's needs, as well as those of any other industrialized nation, and given a longer 
time horizon, the needs of all energy consumers worldwide. The first step involves freeing 
ourselves from the analyses and recommendations of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). This organization and its related international and national organizations (e.g. IAEA,  
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the US DOE EIA) are the unquestioned record holders in peddling defective forecasts and 
recommendations.
Diagram 21: Nuclear power industry forecasts and real trends (nuclear energy 
production capacity in gigawatts)34
In the 1970s and 80s they were champions of nuclear power propaganda. And their 
perspective turned out to be entirely wrong. Today they ignore all signs of resource 
exhaustion, climate change and of the substantial progress toward use of renewable 
energy. They repeat the same errors they made for decades: 
x Misestimating reserves. 
x Misestimating the production costs of conventional techniques. 
x Ignoring cost reductions for renewable forms of energy. 
x Benign neglect of environmental impacts. 
In the eyes of the IEA the share of renewable energy will barely increase over the next 30 
years. The quality of the IEA's forecast is downright disastrous with respect to the role of 
wind energy. The steadily dropping costs of wind power installations and the resulting rise 
in the return on investment in them is consistently ignored. In its World Energy Outlook 
1998 the IEA predicted that by 2020 a total of 45 GW of wind power capacity would be 
installed. The reality is that by 2003 the installed capacity already reached 39 GW, and the 
2020 goal of 45 GW will be attained in 2004.35
Since 1993, the wind power market has expanded tenfold to over $7 billion. At good 
locations, new wind power plants now are cheaper than new oil, coal or nuclear-based 
power, and (in Europe) it costs the same as power from gas, in the US even less. The 
economic and ecological profile of wind power is remarkable: investment costs of less than 
1$/watt, short building times (2-20 weeks), winter and summer production peaks 
(depending on location), global availability, no emissions, no fuels and disposal costs and 
steadily falling generation costs thanks to increasingly efficient installations. Wind power is 
fully immune to oil and gas price fluctuations. Wind hedging is gaining in importance on 
the US power market where US gas supply system is collapsing. 
The potential of wind power indeed is enormous: On an offshore area of 200 km x 200 km 
equipped with two 5-MW turbines per km2 it would be possible to produce the amount of 
electricity consumed by the European Union (EU-15). The Danes, Germans and British are 
feverishly developing offshore wind farms, which promise a clean, inexhaustible and over  
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the long run very cheap power supply from the North and Baltic Sea and similar locations. 
In the long run, a full replacement of conventional energy by renewables is possible and 
will not bear greater costs than today's energy system.36
Wind power, solar power, geothermal energy and steady improvements in energy efficiency 
can do much to defuse conflicts over oil. But still, additional non-technical measures must 
come from the industrialized countries: 
x Review of NATO Statutes: discontinuing the out-of-area strategy for securing energy 
resources such as oil, natural gas, raw materials, etc. 
x Reform the IEA to make it into more of a self-help organization for energy security and 
conflict resolution. 
x Re-establish an IRENA, an International Renewable Energy Agency. 
x Generate independent oil production and reserves statistics. 
x Develop a Marshall Plan for renewable energy with low-interest loans and a high 
degree of investor security for renewable energy projects. 
Defusing resource-based conflicts will call for greater cooperation with OPEC instead of 
imperialist wars. Supplier-consumer relations must be strengthened by: 
x Steering export quantities - fair trade agreements. 
x Clarifying the rights of producing countries. 
x Sharing the financial benefits with areas where production is located. 
x Agreeing on an environmentally and socially sustainable rate of extraction. 
Lastly, resource policies and climate policies must be linked: 
x Creating an international court of arbitration to deal with legal issues surrounding oil 
extraction and rights, with local population enjoying their own inalienable rights. 
x Instituting an internationally binding "minimal fossil resources tax", to be raised over 
time, coordinated by WTO-institutions. 
x Linking the Kyoto Agreements to the WTO framework (sanctions/import duties for 
countries with inadequate consumption or production standards). 
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7 Petroleum and Violent Conflicts: 
What is the Role of Switzerland? 
Panel discussion edited by Matthias Dettling 
This chapter is an edited transcript of the panel discussion featuring 
- Christine Batruch, Vice-President of the "Corporate Responsibility" division of the 
Swedish oil company Lundin Petroleum AB, which has its main branch in Geneva, 
- Dr. Rolf Hartl, Director of the "Swiss Petroleum Union", the association of the Swiss 
mineral oil industry, 
- Dr. Ivo Kaufmann, head of "Foreign Investments and Multinational Enterprises" of 
the State Secretariat of Economic Affairs (seco), 
- Dr. Rudolf Rechsteiner, member of the Swiss Parliament, economist and university 
lecturer in environmental policy at the University of Basel, 
- and as facilitator Dr. Barbara Haering, Director of econcept AG, member of the Swiss 
Parliament and of the Board of swisspeace. 
The panelists, who are all based in Switzerland and together represent almost the whole 
supply chain of petroleum, discussed possibilities of and limits to conflict prevention and 
peace promotion in oil-producing countries. 
Barbara Haering: Ms. Batruch, your company came under some serious scrutiny and 
pressure from a number of NGOs accusing Lundin Petroleum for having aggravated the civil 
war in Sudan. Could you please tell us more in detail about your business experience in 
countries where the conditions of good governance are more or less lacking? 
Christine Batruch: As an upstream oil company we explore and produce oil, but we 
neither refine nor distribute it. Our main priority is to look for oil reserves. Therefore, our 
first concern is not at all about politics. We look at a country in terms of its geology. That is 
our starting point. 
After it has been determined that there may be a possibility of oil, our second concern is 
whether or not it is economical to actually go to that country and look for oil. Only then do 
we assess the potential risks associated with operating in a particular country. The first risk 
is financial: do the potential returns justify making an investment in a certain area? Apart 
from financial risks we also consider other dimensions. Security would obviously be an 
important issue in a conflict situation. We have to determine whether or not our presence 
would put our employees or anybody in the surrounding area at risk. 
Corporate responsibility has widened the scope of what risk analysis means. We not only 
consider financial aspects. We do look at other aspects such as the social environment, the 
political environment and the ecological sustainability of our business activities. The 
experiences we had in Sudan highlight the fact that not only economic aspects play an 
important role. If there is one lesson we learned, it's that we now make the risk analysis 
ahead of time. Although it may not change our decision to go to a country, it may change 
the way we go there and the requirements we have to meet. If we go to a country like 
Sudan, we have to know who we are and we have to define our role. As an economic actor 
we are there to make money for ourselves and for our partners. Partners include the host 
country government and the local communities. Our role is to improve our own and our 
partners' situation over time. Corporate responsibility has made us realize that there are 
actors other than the ones who are actively involved in a contract with us. There has been a 
shift of paradigm from shareholders to stakeholders. 
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In the case of Sudan, we had to deal with a conflict situation which had not previously 
existed in our area of operations. When we began with our exploration activities, there was 
a peace agreement covering this area. When the conflict eventually spread into our area of 
operations, we first of all tried to find out what the issues were. The issues were far more 
complex than "oil comes and there's a problem". Oil has had an important role in the 
peace process, both on the negative side by exacerbating some of the demands that were 
made on either side, and on the positive side by calling international attention. Oil has 
brought about international demands to the conflict situation and has thereby stimulated 
the peace process in a significant way. For the first time, there is now some hope that the 
peace process will materialize because there is a material basis for peace, which was 
obviously lacking in Sudan before the oil came. 
If we talk about the stakeholders, it's important to examine each party that could 
potentially be affected, either directly or indirectly, by our operations. Both our own 
requirements and the requirements of all the stakeholders have to be integrated into our 
way of operating. As a Swedish oil company, we are listed on the Swedish stock market 
exchange. Therefore, we are accountable to our Swedish shareholders who of course are 
important and have their own concerns. In spite of being a small company, we are the 
largest Swedish oil company with a high visibility in our home country. We are very much 
engaged in a dialogue with our home government, with members of parliament, and with 
various NGOs active both in Sweden and in host countries. Another stakeholder is the host 
government, because oil contracts are usually made with them. Among the stakeholders 
are also the local communities. Oil companies don't operate in a social vacuum. Oil 
companies work through people and our employees in the field interact with the local 
communities on a daily basis. They have to feel comfortable about our work and about the 
people they see every day. In the case of Sudan, it was the Nuer community. We had 
contacts with them throughout, both at the outset when there was an agreement with the 
leaders of that community that oil activities were a useful start-up for the area. Even during 
the period when some of them defected and decided that oil operations were not positive, 
we still continued our discussions with them. And lastly, stakeholders are also the members 
of civil society, both local and international organizations. At different times, they all had 
some role to play in the way we were running our operations in Sudan. 
Barbara Haering: You mentioned that your risk analysis has to be much more 
comprehensive than it used to be, taking into account not only short-term shareholder 
values, but also stakeholder values and the long-term perspectives of the country. How do 
you make sure that your code of conduct will influence your work down to the shovel? 
Christine Batruch: Being a small company, Lundin Petroleum has a great advantage. 
There are not so many hierarchical levels between our CEO and the shovel. In the case of 
Sudan, our CEO traveled to the field at least every couple of months and maintained 
personal contacts with everybody working for our company. I traveled to Sudan on a 
regular basis and had discussions with all our employees, both Sudanese and foreign 
employees, as well as with the host government. We discussed, for example, what the code 
of conduct means to us and how we intend to implement it in the field. We conducted 
targeted actions like human rights training for some of our staff in Sudan as well as our 
corporate staff in Sweden and Switzerland. It may sound strange to some of you that one 
would need something like that, but also remember that before Sudan we were never faced 
with any human rights issues. These issues have to first be translated to people who don't 
have regular contacts with the local communities. To sum it up, we have an internal  
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reporting system, we have compliance, and we have regular field visits. Our code of 
conduct is an active document and not a paper tiger. 
Barbara Haering: How do you report to the government of the host country and to your 
home country? 
Christine Batruch: Although we're a Swedish company we have our offices in Switzerland, 
which is one of the reasons why I'm on this panel. In fact, we consider that we have two 
home governments: the Swedish government and to a certain extent the Swiss 
government. Yet, there is no legal tie with the Swiss government, because our Sudan 
operations are not directly linked to Switzerland. Nonetheless, given our presence, we 
considered that it would be useful to be in contact with the Swiss government and report 
about our operations in Sudan. We were in contact with the Swiss government through the 
Swiss chargé d'affaires in Sudan Ms. Marianne Engeler. She used to raise issues with us 
and we used to discuss our actions with her. She visited our operations as part of a 
delegation of ambassadors to assess the impact of the oil on the conflict. In addition, 
Switzerland played a very important role in the peace deal in the Nuba mountain area 
between the SDLA and the Sudanese government. Thanks to the offices of special 
ambassador Mr. Josef Bucher, it was possible to negotiate a comprehensive peace deal in 
Sudan. For the first time, the Sudanese government and the SDLA managed to agree on a 
cessation of hostility and stick to it for an extended period of time. We had the opportunity 
to meet with him and discuss these issues. As for our other home government Sweden, we 
have weekly discussions with representatives of the ministry of foreign affairs. We also 
have meetings with Sweden's members of parliament as well as EU members of parliament 
who also sent a delegation to our concession area. 
Barbara Haering: Thank you, Ms. Batruch. Mr. Kaufmann, as the representative of one of 
Lundin's two home countries, you would be the potential receiver of a report of Lundin to 
Switzerland. There are a few oil-producing companies based in Switzerland. Above all, 
there are companies in Geneva and Zug that trade in refined and crude oil. Last but not 
least, Switzerland is also a financial center where many transactions of the oil industry are 
carried out. Considering all this, Mr. Kaufmann, how do you ensure that our foreign 
economic policy does not contradict our foreign policy? What are the efforts of Switzerland 
in the field of corporate social responsibility? 
Ivo Kaufmann: As the head of a government unit dealing with international investments, 
with corporate responsibility on an international level, and in particular with the fight 
against corruption, I would first of all like to give a brief overview of the legal instruments 
and possibilities that a government has in the field of corporate responsibility. The main 
problem is the lack of governance in many oil-producing countries. This not only affects the 
local populations, but also the corporations operating in these countries. 
Being a small country, Switzerland's possibilities are limited to diplomacy and to the 
multilateral level like the World Bank, the IMF, or the UN. A government can also influence 
these governance problems within the scope of development cooperation, especially by 
directly working together with civil society and NGOs in the corresponding countries. 
Furthermore, being a major international player in the finance sector, Switzerland has made 
significant efforts in the past years and even became a role model in the field of restitution 
of asset values of politically exposed persons. It is not uncommon that such asset values 
are linked to the oil industry and are stored on Swiss bank accounts. 
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The main issue I would like to raise is the relationship between the governments and the 
multinational corporations. Until recently, there have only been certain soft law instruments 
available. But among the member states of the OECD, we now have a severe criminal 
liability for bribing corrupt public officers abroad. This is a change of paradigm. Until the 
late 1990s, it was possible to deduct bribes paid abroad from your taxes. Today however, 
you risk a jail sentence and massive fines. 
Unfortunately, the field of soft law is not given the credit it deserves. The OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Corporations, for example, act as a remarkably substantial instrument. 
They are not just recommendations. They make it possible to submit cases of wrong 
conduct of multinational corporations that is not in line with the guidelines to a national 
contact point. If the case is substantiated, the national contact point will initiate an 
informal conciliation process and is obliged to release a statement in case the corporation 
is not willing to discuss the problems in question. As modest as this sanction may be, it's 
definitely not without any impact. Currently, it's predominantly trade unions that keep us 
and other national contact points busy with cases. 
The UN Global Compact complements the OECD guidelines, however the sanctions are 
missing. The UN Global Compact is supported by the UN as a universal organization and 
demands a commitment from the companies to the nine principles. We have noticed that 
especially big multinational companies integrate both instruments into their code of 
conduct.
Barbara Haering: If we talk about soft laws like the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises or the nine principles of the UN Global Compact, do you see the possibility or 
the need for transforming parts of these soft laws into hard law? If yes, which are the most 
important points in these guidelines that would be more effective if they weren't only soft 
law? My second question is: All these guidelines target first and foremost producing 
companies and they are less applicable to trading companies. What are the possibilities to 
hold the latter more accountable? 
Ivo Kaufmann: We have a globalized economy, yet we don't have globalized governance. 
From my perspective, I can't tell you which principles and in which priority they should 
become hard law. First of all, a critical mass of international support is necessary to bring 
about international regulations that are credible and effective. We have no interest in any 
ius cogens if it can't be implemented. We believe that it is better to go step-by-step and to 
really consolidate existing rules before we develop new ones. 
Barbara Haring: Does this imply that in the foreseeable future we will still have to rely on 
the pressure of NGOs, the public, and politicians to ensure that companies comply with the 
soft laws on a voluntary basis? 
Ivo Kaufmann: I claim that pressure comes from different stakeholders and that 
governments also have an interest in solving these problems. For example, in the fight 
against corruption the main actors have been governments: the OECD convention in 1997, 
the convention of the European Council in 1999, and most recently the convention against 
corruption of the UN. These are all instruments that were spurred by the internal priorities 
of governments. 
Barbara Haering: Thank you, Mr. Kaufmann. Mr. Hartl, as the director of the Swiss 
Petroleum Union you are a potential business partner of Ms. Batruch. You import oil to 
Switzerland and all the companies associated with your union are responsible for seeing  
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that the oil gets to Switzerland. What efforts are you making to improve the standards of 
transparency and product declaration as a condition for legitimate action and 
accountability?
Rolf Hartl: The Swiss Petroleum Union is a branch association. Our members are the Swiss 
subsidiaries of the multinational corporations, the subsidiaries of the Swiss cooperatives 
Migros and Coop as well as a few small- and medium-sized oil importers. 
Indeed, corporate social responsibility does not only happen upstream but also 
downstream. If you take a look at the brochures of multinational corporations, you realize 
that the standards are the same both upstream and in Switzerland. There are, however, 
reasons why the discussion about corporate social responsibility only takes place upstream. 
It's because the oil companies in Switzerland operate in a democratic state with the rule of 
law. Switzerland sets an explicit legal framework for our business. The regulations in the 
field of health, security and the environment are not only specified, they are also enforced. 
We live in an environment free of corruption. Neither politicians nor state officials can be 
bribed, with very few exceptions. Our economic order is competitive and those who offend 
against competition law are punished. We have watchdogs, NGOs, and a sensitized public. 
From this point of view, I can sit back and relax, because the discussion about corporate 
social responsibility is not very relevant to us. 
However, it's a fact that whatever happens in Chad or in the North Sea has an immediate 
impact on our business and especially on the business of the multinational corporations. 
From this point of view, it's in our interest that everybody in the whole chain of the oil 
business meets their claims of responsible action. 
As for the question of transparency: In Switzerland, transparency is a given. The oil 
companies abide by the state regulations. Whoever is listed on the stock market exchange 
is obligated to disclose in line with the stock corporation law. 
As for the question of product declaration: The idea that oil could be labelled has been 
raised before. Consumers would then be sure that the oil is politically, environmentally, and 
socially clean. Yet, this is a very difficult task. If it were easy, an entrepreneur from my 
branch would have raised this idea long ago. I would like to give you the reasons why this 
is so difficult. The oil business sector is the globalized sector par excellence, even before 
anybody started to talk about globalization. Oil is a commodity uniformly traded all over 
the world. One consequence is that it's extremely difficult, I would even say it's virtually 
impossible to label petrol and to declare its source. Two thirds of our oil requirements come 
from refineries in the European Union. Once refined, it can't statistically be determined 
where the crude oil came from initially. In addition to this, oil companies use common 
storage for crude oil and for end products. Many companies use a joint storage hall so that 
oil from different sources is poured into the same barrel. The practical problems should not 
be underestimated. They are due to the structure of our branch, not only in Switzerland, but 
also everywhere else. 
Barbara Haering: I understand your answer on a technical level. Yet there were also 
problems for labeling electricity and a model has been found. Last week my company 
decided to sign up for a hydroelectric power supply. Although we didn't have the option for 
solar or wind energy, at least we could decide to use hydroelectric power. By the way, the 
electrons are exactly the same. It seems to me that labeling the oil should definitely be a 
possible strategy. 
64
Rolf Hartl: It may be possible in a very virtual operation. Those who invented electricity 
labels already came to our industry and proposed the same idea for oil. But there are also 
political considerations: what are the criteria that should make up a politically correct label 
for oil? What would such a rating system look like? Looking at the oil-producing countries I 
get pretty nervous, because there is hardly any oil left that deserves being labeled: Let's 
start with the North Sea. I suppose that we can all agree that Norway and the UK are 
democratic countries. But then we go to Russia or to the states of the Middle East with 
together 40% of the world oil production. Then we go to Africa with 10% of the world oil 
production or to South America. At least, the number three of the world oil production is 
still the USA and Canada together. What are valid criteria? Criteria relating to the social 
order of the producer countries, to the environment, and to security standards would all 
have to be defined. This would be a very difficult task. 
And the practical problems that I mentioned should not be underestimated. It's easier to 
certify electricity from a hydroelectric power station in Canton Grisons and to sell it to 
consumers in Zurich. The production of oil is much more complex. And just think about the 
problem of transport: which ships should be admitted and which ones not. 
Barbara Haering: Ms. Batruch, have you ever discussed the question of labeling your oil? 
Christine Batruch: No, not at all. As I mentioned before, we only sell crude oil. When we 
sell our oil, it's obvious where it comes from. In Tunisia, we sell our oil in Tunisia. In France, 
we sell it in France. Labeling the oil is more a downstream responsibility. 
Barbara Haering: Therefore, Mr. Hartl, it's the responsibility of the intermediaries and the 
traders. Ms. Batruch knows where her oil comes from. It's you who has to pass it on and 
tell the consumers that it comes from Sudan. 
Rolf Hartl: This will be rather difficult. When Ms. Batruch ships a load of crude oil to 
Rotterdam, it is processed by a corporation or an independent refinery. The refined oil is 
then usually stored in large storehouses. A couple of days later, a certain quantity will be 
taken out, loaded onto a ship on the Rhine, and transported to Switzerland. These 
storehouses contain oil from different sources, from the North Sea to Chad. If you want to 
label the oil, this is the main problem. 
Another issue is the consumer. In the case of petrol, it becomes obvious that people only 
care about prices. Ideas have already been proposed about having a pump A with normal 
petrol and a pump B with Max-Havelaar-petrol that is sold at an additional charge of, for 
example, 2 cents per liter. I assure you that nobody will buy this petrol. I give you a reason 
in a different context. Imagine two petrol stations on the same street, one with petrol for 
1.31, the other one for 1.32. You can bet your life that people will refuel their car for 1.31, 
no matter if it's a dirty, ugly petrol station, one with or without a shop. These are the facts 
and we are the victims of our own transparency. We are the only industry in Switzerland 
that declares its prices in such a transparent manner. Due to the price declaration the 
consumer is practically educated to go by the price. There are insane examples of people 
making a two-kilometer detour only to get a bargain on petrol. This is the reality. 
Barbara Haering: Thank you, Mr. Hartl. Mr. Rechsteiner, you have been listening as a 
politician this hour. What can a politician from Switzerland do in such a field in the next 
parliamentary session, apart from the fact that you already try to raise awareness of these 
problems in your books? Considering our discussion, what will be your focus in the next 
year?
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Rudolf Rechsteiner: Yes, there are many levels. Over the next four years, we will have to 
decide on the CO2-tax, a decision only taken by the government and the parliament. There 
will be no referendum on this issue. And my task at the moment is, for example, to show 
farmers that a high CO2-price is also a chance. They can, for example, sell wood at 
reasonable prices. I want to inform the public that a reorientation away from oil is a big 
economic opportunity and not a matter of abandonment. It's also a great opportunity 
ecologically, an opportunity for a better quality of life, for a child-friendly environment in 
the cities, etc. There are many aspects, but I think that first of all we have to take away the 
fears that it will lead to economic disaster. Bush is an oil-junkie and an oil-dealer in one 
and he has understood how to instill fear in the American people. They now believe that 
the US economy will perish, if oil becomes more expensive. Yet we notice that the US 
economy perishes, even when the oil remains cheap. In this sense, he was not very 
convincing with objective data. 
I would like to mention another aspect. I find that in the electricity sector we have talked a 
lot about labelling and a lot has been achieved. We have succeeded in creating a little 
pioneer market for green energy. Even though I'm a shareholder of such green electricity 
companies, I do not advocate for a retreat of the state in this sector. It cannot all be left to 
a few consumers to buy Havelaar-coffee and green electricity. I believe that consumers are 
important, as they can give impulses, but the state cannot just withdraw from this 
responsibility and has put a framework in place for a growing share of green energy. 
There is also a connection with the discussion about climate. We have to bring OPEC and 
consumer countries to one table and countries have to be rewarded for stretching their oil 
production, which means that they produce less. A coordinated decrease in oil production 
would mean that prices rise strongly. 
The perception in the industrialized countries is that the OPEC wants to kill them, that 
OPEC is a bunch of monopolists, of thieves. In the eyes of the OPEC the whole climate 
discussion is a strategy to take away profits from them. The higher the taxes here, the 
lower the price margin for the Saudis. The logical conclusion would be that we do have a 
resource problem and that the shortage is becoming more acute. We have to get away 
from trying to sell as much as possible in the shortest possible time. But we should sit 
down and say that we want to reduce the total discharge of CO2. We should reduce the 
total consumption and divide the producers' profit between both parties. The OPEC would 
receive a little bit higher prices and the oil-importing countries would introduce a tax that 
remains inside the country. I believe that such a strategy is negotiable, cheaper and more 
peaceful than the imperial strategy of the US, which doesn't lead to success in the end. I 
am convinced that this strategy won't spare us a crisis and will cause the contrary of what 
Bush wants. The oil taps will be closed – not only in Iraq, but also in Venezuela. I am 
certain that the reduction in production is related to the threat of the US. Venezuela 
doesn't want to open up to American firms, because of the fear that they would lose out. I 
therefore believe that it would be more reasonable to make contracts with individual 
countries and to follow a different oil policy than the one we have had so far. 
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8 Conflict-Sensitive Resources Policy: 
Vision or Illusion? 
Panel discussion edited by Andreas Zumach 
This chapter is an edited transcript of the panel discussion featuring 
- Prof. Paul Collier, Director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at 
the University of Oxford, 
- Prof. Riccardo Petrella, Professor of Economics at the Catholic University of Louvain 
in Belgium, founder and President of the Lisbon Group, and author of the book "The 
Water Manifesto: Arguments for a World Water Contract", 
- Dr. Wolfgang Sachs, Project Manager of "New Models of Wealth" at the Wuppertal 
Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy, and author of "Planet Dialectics: 
Explorations in Environment and Development", 
- and as facilitator Andreas Zumach, journalist at the UN headquarters in Geneva and 
a correspondent for the Swiss public TV news program. 
The panel discussion placed the issue of oil and violent conflicts in the broader framework 
of resource use and distribution and looked at ways to design a resources policy more 
sensitive to conflict. 
Andreas Zumach: We have so far only focused on the (oil) resource curse in African 
countries, but we have not yet considered that there may not be enough (oil) resources 
available within our lifetime. If we take the data seriously that Mr. Rechsteiner has put 
forward about the development of energy consumption in the 30-50 year period ahead and 
about the availability of oil and gas in the world, then we have to look at "The Role of 
Petroleum in Violent Conflicts" from a different angle. 
Mr. Sachs, is there any vision left for a conflict-sensitive resources policy, if we accept as a 
fact that most western governments will most probably continue their energy consumption 
patterns of the last 50 years and that the consumption of oil and gas will increase by 
roughly 50 percent by the year 2050, while developing foreign policies and military 
strategies to secure "our" energy resources? 
Wolfgang Sachs: It is not possible to talk about a conflict-sensitive resources policy 
without a notion of the finiteness of the biosphere, and of oil in particular. There is a limit 
to the availability of resources which we are moving closer to. In order to maintain the 
conditions necessary for a flourishing citizenship in the world, we need to stop the 
exploration of oil right now – not only because of authoritarian regimes and violent 
conflicts, but also because we already have four times more oil reserves than we can afford 
to use because of the greenhouse effect. Moreover, let me remind you that apart from 
corrupt regimes and violent conflicts, drilling oil is in many instances also a livelihood 
question. Indigenous areas are being more and more affected by pushing the frontier 
towards more remote and ecologically fragile areas. In Ecuador, oil development means 
cutting forests, building roads, setting up derricks, contaminating water, in other words 
destroying parts of the biosphere, which is the indispensable source of livelihood for the 
people living there. About one third of people in the world, usually the most powerless and 
marginalized, are critically dependent on their ecosystems. Their life is based on direct 
access to nature. Resource extraction such as drilling oil, mining, etc. is often a real threat 
to their sources of livelihood. This is another issue of resource justice which you could call 
an issue of environmental human rights: Do we have a resource system allowing the most 
marginalized peoples in the world to survive in dignity? 
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Andreas Zumach: Mr. Petrella, you claim in your book that there are resources which are 
more important than others, resources which a person needs for his or her livelihood. You 
demand that water, which you call a "common good" belonging to all human beings, 
should neither be privatized nor commercialized. Even if this principle was globally 
accepted, the problem would still remain that water is a scarce resource whose use and 
consumption has to be regulated. What would be the criteria for such a regulation? How 
much water should every human being be allowed to use per day, week, month, or year? 
And who should define these criteria? What should we do with countries or communities 
that spoil water? 
Riccardo Petrella: The problem is that we have made water a scarce resource. In 
principle, there is enough water for everybody. Originally, water was a renewable resource. 
But we are turning water into a non-renewable resource. Through over-pumping, water 
reservoirs are declining all over the world and we don't allow these resources to naturally 
renew themselves. We are not a very intelligent society. We have introduced the concept 
that water is an economic good. Another aspect is that we have accepted that nothing can 
be done about it and that there is no alternative. We predict that within the next 30 years 
60% of the global population will live in regions characterized by water shortage, and that 
by the year 2080 over 80% won't have access to drinking water. While we are telling the 
people of our generation that water security is becoming an important strategic issue, we 
have come to accept that there will be between four and five million people with no access 
to drinking water by the year 2030. I'd like to ask all those experts on which basis they 
have the right to anticipate these problems and at the same time tell the public that 
nothing can be done about it? Why are we trying to convince everybody that the right to 
life will be limited to only certain segments of the world's population? How can we accept 
that by 2015 three billion people will live in poverty and won't have access to drinking 
water in the quality and quantity necessary for life? We cannot accept that the right to life 
is excluded by definition. Ensuring the right to life for all people on this planet means that 
we cannot continue with our current pattern of water use and consumption. We cannot 
continue to have 70% of the world's water resources tapped for the purpose of intensive 
agriculture which destroys soils and water resources and impoverishes peoples in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. We cannot continue to use water for the production of electricity, 
if this means, like for instance in China, displacing millions of people from their homes. We 
cannot accept that people in California use 4'100 litres of fresh water per capita per day for 
domestic purposes, while people in Germany use 158 litres and people in Switzerland 160 
litres. How can we then talk about the Global Compact or about codes of conduct for 
companies and households? Accepting that such soft regulations should govern the way 
we are using resources is the legalization of a criminal behavior. 
Andreas Zumach: Mr. Collier, your use of the term "corporate social responsibility" this 
morning was challenged by Mr. Wesselink who said that what is really needed is not 
responsibility, but accountability. I'd like you to react to this. You also used the term "good 
governance" referring to the countries in the South. But given the whole dimension of 
resource use in the Northern countries, would it not be fair to also raise the question of 
whether or not we have good governance and to seriously challenge ourselves with this 
concept?
Paul Collier: To your question about accountability versus responsibility: We are in a 
process of quite a rapid evolution of international practice across a range of commodities. It 
is because of what happened in fur that we got movement in diamonds: no fur, no 
Kimberley. It is because of the Kimberley process in diamonds that we got movement in  
 Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Role of Petroleum in Violent Conflicts 
   69 
timber. I think we will see movement in oil and it will be thanks to this general climate. 
Progress in each commodity helps the more general progress of improving the governance 
of natural resources. 
A very good example of the difficulties in the transition from voluntarism to compulsion are 
the OECD's anti-bribery laws. Until recently, the legal position on the bribery of public 
officials was quite extraordinary. In fact, it was a tax-deductible expense in a lot of 
European countries. And now this has changed. It was very difficult to achieve this change 
because no country wanted to disadvantage its own companies. That was the essence of 
the problem. Everybody recognized it was wrong, but nobody wanted to put its companies 
into disadvantage. So it required collective action. And that is what the OECD is for: 
collective action by a bunch of rich country governments that could finally agree on passing 
this anti-bribery legislation. I think this is what we will see across the board on 
commodities. I think we will probably see it in diamonds. The great thing about the 
Kimberley process is that it is the industry itself which says it is necessary. Then the 
question is comes up: is the voluntary system working? If it works, that is great. If it 
doesn't work, then what? Well, the industry can not oppose the move from voluntarism to 
compulsion, if it is demonstrated that voluntarism does not work. 
One remark on oil labeling: From an economic point of view, oil labeling is easy. When we 
try to track oil as it moves from Angola to the petrol pump in Berne, we don't actually try to 
track a set of molecules. It doesn't matter where the molecules come from. We, in fact, try 
to track an economic and legal concept which is the purchase of a number of barrels of oil. 
If a million barrels of oil from Angola go into a refinery, a million barrels of oil from Angola 
have got to come out of the refinery – and this is documented. Then, if consumers say they 
don't want Angolan oil, they can go back and ask for oil from a different source. Good 
governance requires tracking, transparency and scrutiny. There's obviously an element of 
governance in the countries that are producing the oil and there are also elements of 
governance in the countries consuming the oil. The physical tracking of commodities 
requires cooperation between the producer and the consumer countries. You track the 
commodity and you track the financial flows of the money that is paid for the commodity. 
Only then can you really ensure scrutiny and, in most cases, you will find the money 
somewhere in the banks of the consumer countries. The governance of tracking in the case 
of oil is more the responsibility of the Swiss government than it is of the government of 
Chad.
Wolfgang Sachs: I'd like to take your basic argument, Mr. Collier, and push it much 
further, because what I have so impressively learned from you is that oil, in many instances, 
lubricates dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. These dictatorships and authoritarian 
regimes performed a very good service for the oil consumers and for the corporations in 
terms of keeping the upstream part of the oil resource chain protected from social unrest. It 
is not an accident that the Saudis have their function in securing oil, as had Abacha in 
Nigeria, as has Putin in Russia today. It is beneficial for Western interests to have the 
upstream part of the resource chain taken care of and protected by these kinds of 
authoritarian regimes. There is a collusion which should not be lost in our discussion. The 
collusion is even deeper when we look at the institutional values governing our interstate 
system. We are still ready to accept on the international level values which we would never 
accept domestically. We accept that any kind of cruel group capturing power in a particular 
state is entitled to have full sovereignty over the country and to own and sell its resources 
as they please. That is a resource privilege which we are ready to concede to any kind of 
government, regardless of its character. We would never allow this domestically, it would 
be considered illegitimate. Procedures should possibly be designed to link the right of  
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sovereignty over resources to certain criteria of democracy and accountability on the part of 
a government. 
Andreas Zumach: Mr. Petrella, I want to repeat my earlier question to you. Given the 
problem as you have described it in your first statement, what is the answer? Is it simply 
enough to have campaigns against the further privatization and commercialization of 
water? Despite your statement that originally water was not a limited resource, the fact 
remains that there are already wars being fought about water. Are there criteria by which 
we can decide both in the rich and in the poor countries about the amount of water a 
person should be allowed to consume? And what are the necessary means of enforcement 
to ensure that such regulations are being implemented? 
Riccardo Petrella: You are raising a political question. My answer will also be a political 
one. You are asking whether we are willing to live together. Are we, the six billion 
inhabitants of this planet, ready to live together and use the resources in a fair manner? 
And who has the right to determine the criteria for life? We must fight against the 
privatization and the commercialization of access to life and of life in general. In terms of 
oil, we have to move away from the perception that oil is a private resource and a private 
national resource. The same applies to water. They should be considered a common good 
and they should be publicly managed, as well as the sun, the forest, etc. 
Andreas Zumach: Your list is probably not finished. I could think of a few more 
commodities. Mr. Sachs, you would like to make a comment. 
Wolfgang Sachs: I wanted to avoid getting the moderator frustrated because his question 
about the criteria has not yet been answered. Let me give it a try: We are operating under 
two basic conditions. One is limits to resources, the other is inequality. The outcome of this 
situation is the overall criteria that nobody should damage the biosphere beyond its 
regenerative capacity. Because inequality is the cause of conflict, I would like to focus on it 
and establish two rules. The first rule is that the distribution of resources has to be such 
that human rights, and more precisely subsistence rights, are guaranteed everywhere in the 
world. That is the minimal concept of justice. Considering all the environmental problems 
the poorest and most vulnerable people in the world are facing today, it is highly 
questionable that they have the livelihood means they require. The second rule applies to 
the distribution among nations. For such global resources like the atmosphere, I argue that 
each citizen of the world is entitled to an equal share of the atmospheric commons. In 
other areas it is not as easy. This formula doesn't make sense for water, forest, or fish, 
because not everybody needs the same amount. However, the distribution has to be such 
that every society is able to advance with its own project of society and of well-being. So I 
hesitate to say "an equal share", but at least a fair share. The consequences are: the 
transnational consumer class has got to retreat from the environmental space for making 
room for everybody. The majority of societies today do not get their fair share of world 
resources. Therefore, the over-consumers have got to retreat. This leads me to the 
conclusion that resource productivity or the art of creating wealth with ever less resources 
is not only an ecological issue, but it is a cornerstone for a peaceful world. The kind of 
wealth invented and shaped by what I referred to as the transnational consumer class, of 
which corporations are a part, is impressive. But it is also clear that this kind of wealth is 
incapable of justice. It is a form of wealth that cannot be democratized across the world. 
And what is not capable of justice is also not capable of peace. 
Ricardo Petrella: And also not capable of efficiency, because you can not be efficient if 
you are not democratic and fair. 
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Wolfgang Sachs: From that point of view, the best contribution that people like us, our 
cultures, our societies, our economies can offer over the next decades is to reinvent the 
forms of wealth. To reinvent them in a way that they become capable of justice so they can 
be democratized across the world without ruining the biosphere. That is where agendas of 
peace, justice, ecology, and of conflict avoidance converge. 
Paul Collier: I do not like any of that and I fundamentally disagree. You are conflating two 
absolutely distinct problems. On the one hand, there is the problem of conflict in the group 
of economically absolutely marginal countries. They represent a very tiny, almost negligible 
share of the world economy. In economic terms, these countries do not matter. They matter 
because about one billion people live in these countries and if they fall apart, there will be 
global ramifications. In this sense, the countries of the bottom billion do matter. However, 
the overall economic situation for mankind is not as gloomy as it has been described. One 
billion of the world's population has already made it. Four billion are about to make it. 
Economic development for the bulk of mankind is not the catastrophe that has been 
sketched. Catastrophe, in my view, is just a fantasy. And rolling that fantasy in with the 
serious business of addressing the conflicts in the bottom billion gets us into a confusing 
nightmare. There will never be consensus on these romantic illusions – not visions, but 
illusions. But we can build a practical consensus to deal with the ways in which the global 
economy is currently destroying the bottom billion. That is a fixable problem. And it is a 
fixable problem at a minimal expense precisely because these countries are so peripheral to 
the global economy. When this really serious and urgent problem, which I think is fixable 
within the next decade, if the pace of change over the last three or four years is anything to 
go by, becomes wrapped up in these romantic fantasies of world environmental orders, 
then I get very uncomfortable. Because I know these fantasies are going nowhere. 
Andreas Zumach: Does that mean, Mr. Collier, that you deny that keeping the upper 
billion at their current level and bringing the other four billion closer to the upper billion 
would mean ecological catastrophe? 
Paul Collier: Yes, I totally deny that this would mean an ecological catastrophe. The 
message "the four billion cannot develop, because it would be uncomfortable for the upper 
billion" is not only false, but it is disgraceful. The four billion can develop and they will. 
And, of course, systems will adjust. Society will adjust. I will bet you anything that within 
the next two decades American energy prices will go up by a lot. America is going to start 
taxing energy. Why? First: because the geopolitics of low energy prices in America is crazy. 
Second: because of President Bush's "brilliant" economic management. He has managed 
to turn the largest fiscal surplus in America's history into the largest fiscal deficit. They need 
money and the most obvious thing to tax is energy. Over the next couple of decades, 
American energy prices are going to rise for political reasons within America. And that in 
itself will produce an enormous saving in energy. Over the last two decades, energy use per 
dollar of GDP has halved. That is the sort of adjustment which will keep on happening. 
Let me make a few remarks about water. I live in Brittany/France which is about the 
wettest place in the world. If I am confined to drink only one glass of water per day, do you 
really think this helps people in China? No, because water is not an internationally tradable 
good. It is regionally tradable, regionally scarce. That is why you get water conflicts within 
those regions of the world where water is scarce. How much water the Swiss drink has no 
implications to whether or not there is a conflict in the Nile region. 
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Riccardo Petrella: I am glad that the genuine ideas and perceptions are finally being 
revealed. The hidden agenda of the debate so far has been to maintain the idea that 
everybody loves everybody. And only now have I come to realize that this is obviously not 
the case here. In fact, I am very happy to be among the fantasists and illusionists, because I 
think that progress is due to those people of the 19th century who believed in creating a 
welfare society and in everybody's right to life. Maybe Mr. Collier would not exist, had they 
not fought for their fantasies and illusions, sometimes ending up in prison or being killed. I 
claim my right to be a fantasist and illusionist and I like it very much. If 800 million Africans 
had disappeared from this planet thirty years ago, everybody would have considered this a 
disaster for the world economy, as Mr. Collier defined it. But if 800 million Africans 
disappeared today, the world economy wouldn't suffer. Because 800 million Africans make 
up less of the world's GDP than the people in Belgium.  While Belgium represents 1.1% of 
the world's GDP, Africa only represents 0.9%. I don't like this kind of economy. I don't like 
this world. I don't like this distribution of resources. It must be fought against with great 
illusion and fantasy. 
Wolfgang Sachs: I'd like to highlight the three disagreements we have. First: I believe that 
you, Mr. Collier, cannot make your analysis without considering resource demand. The 
demand for resources emanating from certain economies and countries is not represented 
in your analysis. However, it seems to be obvious that the 'clepto-cratic' condition thrives 
on such resource demand. Second: Oil is not only a valuable resource that lubricates 
authoritarian regimes. There is also the oil-climate problem, the oil-availability problem, the 
oil-livelihood problem – you name it. Oil involves many more issues than only 'clepto-
cracies'. Third: Your notion that the four billion have a good chance of advancing in the 
next ten to twenty years is fresh news to me. Considering the multifaceted environmental 
limits, I don't see how the four billion could possibly advance in any conventional manner. 
And even though I agree with your prediction that the USA will probably move towards 
higher energy efficiency, I believe that as long as the overall volume continues to grow, in 
the end we will reach the absolute limit. 
Paul Collier: I disagree. The book "Limits to Growth", which became famous when I was a 
student, made the same catastrophe forecast that never came true. What you miss and 
what "Limits to Growth" missed is the tenet that progress is a continuous process. It 
happens all the time and doesn't switch off. As for the tenet that progress always 
economizes on natural resources, we do debate in economics about what happens to 
natural resource scarcity. The conclusion is, if anything, the opposite of what is being 
claimed here. 
Riccardo Petrella: Since 1972, when "Limits to Growth" was published, inequalities have 
increased. How can you talk about progress? 
Paul Collier: What development economists worry about the most is that over the long 
sweep of the last century, the prices of scarce commodities have tended to fall and the 
countries exporting these natural resources are facing a historical trend of declining prices. 
The reason is that the rate of technical progress economizing on natural resources is faster 
than the rate at which they are being used up. If scarcity reached a peak, prices would rise 
considerably and this would accelerate innovation and economizing on resources. So even 
if we did hit a peak scarcity of something, we would adjust to it. But we haven't reached 
such a peak over the last century and we had a century with an awful lot of economic 
development. Trying to sweep these fantasy problems in with the real and urgent problems 
of conflict in poor countries is a real mistake. 
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Questions and statements from the audience: 
Pia Weber, UNIDIR: I'd like to answer the question Mr. Petrella raised as to whether or 
not we are ready to live together. My rather philosophical answer would be: I don't think 
so, because this question infringes on the very sovereignty of states which also includes 
sovereignty over natural resources. My question to Mr. Collier is about accountability: As I 
understood, accountability would not only be required from the corporations, but also from 
the states. How, in very practical ways, can the international community enforce 
accountability and scrutiny without infringing on the sovereignty of states? 
Olivier Brenninkmeijer, UNIDIR: I agree with Mr. Collier that there are no limits to 
growth, but it is not growth that maintains the status quo. I think this is perhaps where we 
have a misunderstanding. Need creates innovation when it is combined with incentives for 
gain, and this is where growth is always possible. However, gain relates to property. People 
innovate when they know they can achieve something, whether it is satisfaction or 
property. In other words: we can adapt and grow, but there needs to be a play between 
receiving and sharing. 
Paul Collier: I will comment on the question about how sovereignty will have to change. 
The idea that a state can do anything to its population and that there is no right of 
interference cannot be allowed to stand. It has to be gradually eroded. I see several 
processes of erosion. Imagine we could get a strong, clear template of good governance of 
natural resource revenues and a lot of developing countries would sign up to it. It would 
become clear to consumers in the developed countries that you can buy resources from 
these good governance environments. If we got to that stage, there would be a lot of 
pressure. First of all, price differentials would open up between good governance supplied 
commodities and illicit commodities, just like in the Kimberley process. That would put a lot 
of pressure on the bad governance countries to reform themselves. 
The other process of erosion would be the recognition by regional bodies. For example, the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is trying to set standards of how governments have to 
come to power. What we want is an environment where a government that comes to 
power illegitimately is just not recognized and barred from a whole range of activities. To 
give you two examples from the last twelve months, one which worked and one which 
didn't work: In Africa, there were two illegitimate regime changes where a democratically 
elected government was overthrown. One was the Central African Republic, the other was 
Sao Tome and Principe. In the case of the Central African Republic, the OAU couldn't quite 
cope with the problem. It was too big a problem because neighboring countries were 
implicated. With Sao Tome and Principe, it is such a small country that the system worked. 
The coup leaders were forced to step down. So we got the making of two quite different 
processes to put some limit on sovereignty. It would be very important to accelerate this. 
Wolfgang Sachs: I'd like to comment on the question about the relationship between 
growth and innovation. If somebody says that growth is always possible, then I find that 
very astonishing. Infinite growth exists nowhere in the world, nowhere in the biosphere, 
and nowhere in the organic world, unless it turns into a pathology. The only thing that can 
really grow without limits is money.
This is the crucial question: Until now – apart from the post-industrial economies – 
monetary growth has always been linked to physical growth – defined as growth in terms 
of resource throughput. Leave aside the post-industrial economies which have de-linked  
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this connection on a very high level of material input. Only if you can show that monetary 
growth is now possible in our economies by drastically bringing down resource throughput 
– then I would be with you. But so far, nobody has shown that. 
Economic science has got to accept that the economy operates within a larger system – the 
biosphere. If economic science is not able to accept this reality, it will, of course, not take 
into consideration that there are flexible and in the end absolute limits. As the economy 
exists and is part of the biosphere, it is senseless to speak about the absence of limits. The 
moment you accept that the economy cannot be separated from the biosphere, you have to 
be aware of the fact that even high efficiency does not solve the problem of volume, 
because you can be ever more efficient until nothing is left. If you have a forest of a certain 
size, you can use the wood in a very efficient manner. But if you follow the principle of 
economic growth, you will arrive at efficiently destructing the entire forest. This is simple 
logic. The fact that economic science doesn't accept this only reveals that conventional 
economics is a major obstacle to the necessary transition. 
Riccardo Petrella: I'd like to respond to two questions. First: Why do we not want to live 
together? 12% of the world's population own 86% of the world's wealth and represent 
88% of the world's consumption. These 12% have no interest to live together. That's why 
we have invented the concept of security in the last fifteen years. Security is the key word 
of Western civilization today. Above all, security suggests that the 12% want to keep the 
88% ability to consume. This is why President George Bush Senior said in 1992, "I don't 
want to go to Rio, because the American way of life is not negotiable". And because the 
American way of life is not negotiable, his son has rejected the Kyoto-Protocol. 
My thesis is that if we don't change this "illusion", as we have heard today from Professor 
Collier, growth will continue. This is the greatest fantasy. 
Which direction should we follow? I agree with Mr. Sachs who said that we need to 
reinvent welfare. Welfare was an attempt to maintain an equilibrium between the right to 
equality of life for everybody and the limitations of whatever kind of resources. Yes, we 
need to follow this direction. It will take time, maybe 60 or 80 years from now. As far as 
water is concerned, I propose the establishment of a new fiscal system at the global level 
which will enable us to optimize the allocation of resources according to the principle of 
the right to life for everybody. The current fiscal system tries to optimize the allocation of 
financial resources for the purpose of increasing the value for the shareholders. That is not 
a good allocation of resources, because it only serves the interests of very few. The 
invention of a new financial system is absolutely necessary. Under the current financial 
system a good management of global resources is simply not possible. My proposal is: Let 
us be innovative. Don't believe those who have the power and who only claim 
responsibility when it is in their own interest. 
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9 Conclusions: Implications for Peace Policy 
Anita Müller 
A number of significant peace-building initiatives are being undertaken by members of the 
international community, including Switzerland, on behalf of countries affected by violent 
conflict. Among these initiatives are efforts involving reconstruction, humanitarian aid, 
development cooperation, and the support of conflict parties in peace negotiations. Oil, 
however, has rarely been taken as a factor for strategic consideration by external actors 
even when it represents a clear risk potential for further escalation or when its negative 
effects on the conflict in the past are known. Peace researchers and policy makers will have 
to pay more attention to this issue, if the endeavor to stave off crisis and to promote peace 
in oil-producing countries is to achieve any measure of success. This was the tenor 
expressed in all the presentations and discussions at the swisspeace annual conference. 
Peace-building initiatives which focus on the prevention of further violent conflict and 
which address its structural causes within society require a united effort by all relevant 
social forces in order to achieve success. The suggestions and propositions made at this 
conference confirm that a similar approach is needed to develop a conflict-sensitive oil and 
resource policy. The international community, the private sector, national governments, and 
civil society, both here and abroad, face this common challenge. 
Need for research 
Why and how does fossil wealth contribute to the emergence or escalation of intrastate 
conflicts? In Sudan, for instance, it changed the nature of the civil war in two important 
respects, according to Egbert Wesselink and backed by numerous official and non-
governmental human rights reports. On the one hand, the struggle for control over oil 
reserves caused an expansion of the war zone with disastrous consequences for civilians. 
On the other hand, a significant part of the oil revenues was used for military expenditure, 
leading to a further escalation of violence. The use of oil revenues by governments and 
rebel organizations to finance the war, competition for control over resources, and the 
resulting accentuation of local ethnic identities and proliferation of secessionist movements 
can also be observed in other conflict regions characterized by resource wealth. 
Less obvious, but not less important, are the potential effects of oil and natural resource 
wealth on the political and economic systems of oil-producing countries. Paul Collier refers 
to possible relationships between oil and poor governance. Governments that are not 
dependent on taxation for their revenues are less likely to be held accountable by the 
public for their actions. Corruption and lack of transparency are facilitated by the practices 
of oil companies and financial institutions which do not disclose the amount of payments 
made in oil-producing countries. This suggests that the existence of oil reserves, in fact, 
weakens the tie between the state and civil society, favors autocratic governance, and 
aggravates deficiencies in democracy. Some scholars argue that oil wealth fosters 
centralization tendencies and accelerates the privatization of the state by an elite based on 
a system of clientelism. 
Are there specific conditions, economic or political, that have to be met, so that oil wealth 
can also be conducive to the development of a society? Although the significance of the 
role of oil and other natural resources in violent conflicts has been recognized, some of the 
most crucial questions are in need of further research. 
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The issue is not likely to become less relevant in the decades ahead. Although the focus of 
the conference was on the correlation between oil and intrastate conflicts, the urgency of a 
conflict-sensitive oil and resource policy goes beyond national borders. This was made clear 
by the presentation of Rudolf Rechsteiner and the panel discussion with Paul Collier, 
Riccardo Petrella, and Wolfgang Sachs. 
Declining resources coupled with increasing demand and an extremely unequal distribution, 
as well as the dependence of western consumer states on predominantly Muslim oil-
producing countries have a potential for conflict of considerable complexity on a regional 
and global level. Rudolf Rechsteiner argues for political measures to reduce dependence on 
fossil energy, to enhance energy efficiency, and to develop a "Marshall plan" for renewable 
energies. "To reinvent the forms of wealth in a way that they could be democratized across 
the world without ruining the biosphere" is the radical call by Wolfgang Sachs for a 
fundamentally new management of resources. In conjunction with other disciplines of the 
social, environmental, and economic sciences, peace research is challenged to offer creative 
and promising alternatives to military strategies in order to deal with this conflict potential. 
"Do no Harm" and risk assessment 
For actors in the field of development cooperation and humanitarian aid working in conflict 
regions, it is essential to analyze in a systematic way and on a continual basis not only the 
benefits of their actions, but also their potential unintended negative impact on the conflict 
situation. "Do no harm" is the name of one of the best known methods and most 
important principles in this regard. The minimal standard not to "harm" through one's 
actions should also apply to political and economic actors working in areas of violent 
conflict. Christine Batruch shows that a corporation like Lundin Petroleum has a long-term 
interest in thoroughly analyzing the situation in the field, including its own role. Existing 
risk assessments of companies whose first priorities are on geological and financial issues 
should be improved and extended to include conflict risk assessments. By doing so, the 
effects of corporate activities on the local situation with respect to human rights and 
conflict potential can be measured and appraised before and during their operations. 
Conversely, the integration of conflict-sensitivity into planning and monitoring allows 
companies to assess the potential impact of political developments on their own projects. 
Egbert Wesselink calls upon the EU to pass regulations for companies in areas of conflict, 
making risk assessments and their impartial appraisal a legally binding obligation. They 
should be complemented by 'dos and don'ts' for (oil) corporations that become binding 
standards for operations in conflict regions. 
Transparency and accountability 
The most pressing and, at the same time, the most promising initiative in the view of most 
experts is the call for increased transparency about financial flows and the use of oil 
revenues. More transparency would make corrupt practices and the misappropriation of 
revenues by a small elite difficult and would enable local communities to demand 
accountability from their governments. The urgency of such measures becomes all the more 
evident when one considers the fact that a large number of the countries most heavily 
dependent on oil exports have been identified by the World Bank as highly indebted poor 
countries with disastrous human development indicators. 
The conference discussed various initiatives aiming at more transparency in the business of 
natural resources. The most prominent among them is "Publish What You Pay", a  
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campaign supported by a broad coalition of non-governmental organizations. The 
campaign calls for full transparency within oil corporations regarding taxes and other 
payments made to the countries in which they operate. Correspondingly, governments are 
asked to set standards as a condition for oil companies to be listed on the stock exchange 
and to be granted export credit. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
launched by the British government, is an effort inspired by similar objectives, but based on 
voluntarism. Finally, the European parliament called on its member states at the end of 
March 2004 to promote public disclosure of payments to governments by extractive 
companies listed on European stock exchanges. 
More transparency is not only required from corporations extracting oil, but also from 
companies that trade in oil and from financial institutions cooperating with oil companies 
and oil-producing countries. A first step in this direction are the "Equator Principles", in 
which a group of major banks has pledged to abide by the environmental and social 
standards of the World Bank. Whether these mechanisms might work when based on 
voluntarism or self-regulation was a focal point of controversy during the discussion at the 
swisspeace conference. This is especially questionable in countries with very corrupt 
governments and a high level of conflict. In most cases where progress in the development 
of social and environmental standards can be observed, a combination of public pressure, 
the sensitization of entrepreneurs, and the development of norms and regulations has been 
crucially important. 
The role of civil society 
An active, informed, and organized civil society can make a significant contribution in 
ensuring that oil will do less harm to the environment and human populations in the future. 
International non-governmental organizations can support local civil society in its demands 
for more democracy and participation, as well as in holding governments and oil 
corporations accountable. In particular, advocacy and sensitization efforts by civil society 
organizations will still be needed in the future. It is through these efforts that the problems 
in question have appeared on the agendas of international organizations and companies. 
An interesting example is the case of Lundin Petroleum, described by Christine Batruch, 
which was sensitized about its role in Sudan through public campaigns and consultations 
with human rights organizations. It subsequently developed a code of conduct and finally 
terminated its activities there. 
In Chad, a broad international coalition of NGOs could not prevent the realization of an oil 
project. However, their efforts were indispensable in making sure that grants from the 
World Bank were contingent upon certain conditions which led to the establishment of an 
independent controlling body including representatives of civil society. Recently, pressure 
from civil society organizations resulted in a decision by the World Bank to have its policy 
on natural resources examined. In the final report of the "Extractive Industries Review" 
submitted to the World Bank and published in January 2004, it is recommended that good 
governance in the concerned countries should be a criterion for any decision regarding the 
support of projects involving the extraction of natural resources. Furthermore, conflict 
zones are declared as strict "no go zones" for projects dealing with natural resources. 
A coherent peace policy 
Switzerland supports humanitarian development and peace efforts with public funds in 
Sudan, in Angola, and in other resource-rich countries. For the sake of a coherent policy 
development, it would be important to know how much money from oil production and  
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other sources disappears into whose pockets. The fact that companies trading in natural 
resources and financial institutions are well represented in Switzerland makes the claims 
for more transparency in the oil business especially relevant. The sensitization of the private 
sector concerning its role in conflict regions through regular dialogue, the support of 
ongoing international efforts for transparency on the political level, and the obligation of 
resident trade companies and banks to adhere to environmental and social standards even 
when engaging in foreign business ventures are important steps towards a coherent peace 
policy. The swisspeace annual conference has highlighted the important contribution which 
Switzerland could make in these efforts. 
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